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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Liquidity, Banking, and Monetary Policy
by
Jaevin Park
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor Stephen D. Williamson, Chair
The first chapter develops a new theory of bank capital requirements. A general equilib-
rium banking model is constructed in which deposit claims backed by bank assets support
secured credit arrangements with limited commitment. Bank capital, a contingent claim on
bank assets, is costly to hold when the value of assets is insufficient to support an efficient
credit arrangement. However, if there is non-diversifiable aggregate risk, requiring banks to
hold additional bank capital in the high-return state can be beneficial since it can relax the
limited commitment constraint in the low-return state by affecting asset prices. Thus bank
capital requirements can improve economic welfare by trading off the opportunity cost of
holding additional bank capital for the benefit from sharing consumption risk.
The second chapter contains a study of how private information can restrict liquidity
insurance and the implementation of monetary policy. Lack of record-keeping implies that
recognizable assets are essential for trade and also generates a private information problem
when agents are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. A banking arrangement with self-
selection that improves liquidity provision through the use of two different liquid assets is
considered. It is found that when the incentive constraint binds with asset scarcity, there
exists a liquidity premium on illiquid assets which reveals private information. The model is
extended to include monetary policy, specifically Open-Market-Operations. It is shown that
liquidity trap can exist when truth-telling incentive constraints bind.
vii
Chapter 1
Aggregate Risk, Inside Money, and
Bank Capital Requirements
1.1 Introduction
I study how bank capital requirements can influence credit cycles in a liquidity perspective.
Repullo and Suarez (2013) show that the risk-based capital requirements can amplify credit
cycles because higher capital levels are needed in the recessions. However, it is also important
to consider not only the risk aspect, but also the liquidity aspect of bank capital requirements
because bank liabilities such as deposit claims and bank notes are useful for transactions as
collateral while bank capital is not. If bank capital is not useful for credit arrangements
of depositors, raising capital requirements can just reduce credit availability of individual
depositors given that the supply of bank assets is fixed. It is because a proportion of assets
for bank capital holder, indicated as a red rectangle in the Figure 1.1, cannot be a claim for
depositors while the rest of assets, a blue rectangle, can support the deposit claim. It implies
that bank capital requirements can adjust the pledgeability of bank assets, i.e. a proportion
of assets that serves as collateral, under limited commitment of banks.
This paper develops a novel mechanism by which bank capital requirements can improve
1
Asset
Liability
Capital
Figure 1.1: Bank balance sheet with liquidity difference
economic welfare by promoting efficient liquidity provision across the states. In particular,
given aggregate risk and limited commitment, state-contingent bank capital requirements can
play a role in sharing liquidity risk by adjusting the pledgeability of bank assets. This role
of bank capital requirements can provide insight into credit-cycle stabilization and so-called
macro-prudential policy.
In order to explore this issue I develop an asset-exchange model in which bank liabilities
are used to facilitate payments and settlement in an explicit way. This micro-founded model
has the advantage of easily incorporating informational frictions such as limited commitment
and imperfect memory. It is also highly tractable, with an array of assets and a contingent
form of banking contract. This framework is also suitable for welfare analysis in a general
equilibrium as the cost of holding bank capital is determined endogenously in the model
without externalities. The basic structure of the model comes from Rocheteau and Wright
(2005): in the model ex ante heterogeneous agents can trade in the decentralized meetings
and their asset portfolios are rebalanced in the centralized markets. The structure of banking
arrangement is borrowed from Williamson (2012), where bank liabilities are protected only
2
by the value of bank assets with limited commitment. There is a fixed supply of private assets
for which the returns are subject to aggregate risk. Given the aggregate risk, a contingent
banking contract is considered to maximize the ex ante expected value of depositors under
perfect competition.
Limited commitment is a key element in the model, as it can restrict credit provision
by banks.1 Since assets are useful for supporting these credit arrangements, the price of
the assets can be valued not only for their expected stream of future yields, but also for
the usefulness in exchange. This gives rise to a liquidity premium in the price of assets in
equilibrium. In equilibrium under perfect competition banks would not hold bank capital
voluntarily when the supply of real assets is insufficient to support credit arrangements of the
depositors. However, this competitive equilibrium allocation can be constrained-suboptimal
according to the result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).2 This is because the asset
market is incomplete when there is a non-diversifiable aggregate risk in the return of assets.3
Thus there is a possibility to improve economic welfare manipulating the degree of limited
commitment, although the contract is complete and there is no externality.
This paper shows that pro-cyclical capital requirements can improve welfare by stabilizing
credit cycles. Requiring additional bank capital just reduces the pledgeability of assets
so that secured credit is constrained in the high return states. However, restricting the
pledgeability of assets in the high-return states can affect ex ante asset prices because the
liquidity premium on the assets, which is associated with trade inefficiency in each state,
will change. Then the consumption level in the low-return state can increase since the
limited commitment constraint is relaxed as the asset price rises. Thus there is a trade-off
between the opportunity cost of holding additional bank capital and the benefit from sharing
liquidity risk. It is shown that imposing a bank capital requirement in the high-return state
1Unlike government debt, which is supported by the commitment of taxation, bank liabilities are only
protected by the collateralized assets under the limited commitment of banks.
2Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) show that the equilibrium allocation is constrained suboptimal
in a model of competitive general equilibrium with incomplete markets.
3If the asset market is complete then the equilibrium allocation is constrained optimal even though there
exists aggregate risk as shown in Kehoe and Levine (1993).
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can improve welfare as much as the depositors are risk-averse.
This paper makes some key contributions. The mechanism of the main result is different
from the path in the previous literature on pro-cyclical bank capital requirements which is
based on systemic risk. For example, the counter-cyclical buffer in the Basel III accord,
which requires additional bank capital in a period of excess credit growth, is proposed to
reduce a social cost associated with default of banks in recessions. Thus bank capital is
accumulated in the high-return states to be used as a buffer in the low-return states. In
this paper capital requirements can transfer credit availability or purchasing power from the
high-return state to the low-return state by affecting asset prices without a real transfer.
Thus the same pro-cyclical capital requirement is beneficial for society, but in this paper it
is beneficial because this pro-cyclical requirement can stabilize credit cycles.
This result provides a new rationale for bank capital requirements. A conventional ra-
tionale for bank capital requirements is based on deposit insurance: banks will tend to take
too much risk under this safety net, so that bank capital requirements are needed to correct
the moral hazard problem created by deposit insurance. Alternatively, it is sometimes ar-
gued that bank capital requirements can be justified based on an externality associated with
systemic risk. For example, contagion can justify government interventions since a default
of one bank could lead to a chain reaction where many other financial intermediaries could
go bankrupt. However, this paper shows that capital requirements can be rationalized by
incomplete market and limited commitment.
There exists an equilibrium in which bank capital can be held voluntarily even though it
is costly to hold. Since bank capital is not useful for exchange, it is costly for a bank to hold
assets to support bank capital when asset prices reflect a liquidity premium. However, if
the assets are plentiful only in the high-return state, the ex post marginal benefit of holding
assets will be less than the ex ante marginal cost of buying assets. Then bank capital is
useful in the view of depositors because they can avoid holding unnecessary assets in the
high-return state. This result can provide an alternative explanation for the historical fact
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that banks have at times held capital in excess of capital requirements. Berger, Herring, and
Szego (1995) report that in the 1840s U.S. commercial banks had equity-to-asset ratios of
over 50 percent. This ratio declined over time, but it has been kept above the required level
even after the Basel I capital requirement was imposed in the 1990s. The excessive holding
of bank capital has brought about theories for another role of bank capital. For example,
Diamond and Rajan (2000) present a model in which voluntarily held bank capital serves as
a buffer in recessions to prevent bank runs. In this paper I show that strictly positive bank
capital can exist in equilibrium without additional functions of bank capital.
Finally, bank capital requirements can influence macroeconomic variables and the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. In order to study this issue I extend the model by introducing
two additional government-issued assets, i.e. money and government bonds. In the full-
fledged model, the real value of outstanding government debts is kept as constant and the
central bank chooses the proportion between money and government bonds through open
market operations as shown in Williamson (2014). There is an idiosyncratic shock faced
by depositors under which one type of depositor must use currency for trade and the other
type can make a credit arrangement with government bonds and private assets. Since bank
capital requirements can affect the liquidity premium on the asset prices, real interest rates
on the assets can be adjusted without using open market operations. This path allows us to
consider bank capital requirements as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero-
lower-bound where conventional monetary policy is limited. Given a fixed monetary policy,
imposing bank capital requirements can reduce the feasible set of equilibrium allocations. If
the liquidity premium on the backed assets rises by imposing bank capital requirements, the
inflation rate must also rise in equilibrium to make rates of return on currency and govern-
ment bonds equal. Thus given the same credit arrangements, the amount of currency trade
can decrease by imposing bank capital requirements.
5
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature that studies the necessity of bank capital regulations
in a theoretical way.4 One strand of the literature focuses on the moral hazard of banks
induced by deposit insurance. For example, Kareken and Wallace (1978) show that deposit
insurance can create the moral hazard of banks. Kim and Santomero (1988) and Furlong
and Keeley (1989) conduct a pioneering study on the optimal risk-taking problem of banks
by using a mean-variance model and by considering the option value of deposit insurance,
respectively. Dewatripont and Tirole (2012) and Boyd and Hakenes (2014) concentrate
more on managerial looting incentive than risk-taking behavior. The other strand of the
literature is based on the externality associated with systemic risk. In this strand, Allen
and Gale (2006) study an environment where credit risk is not sufficiently transferred to
the insurance institutions to reduce systemic risk. Goodhart et. al. (2012) explore various
types of financial regulations to control fire sales. Farhi and Tirole (2012) build a model
to analyze leverage and maturity-mismatch to address the optimal macro-prudential policy.
Lorenzoni (2008) and Jeanne and Korinek (2011) emphasize pecuniary externality in which
banks cannot internalize systemic risk in the incomplete market. Farhi and Werning (2015)
consider aggregate demand externalities generated by nominal rigidities additionally along
with the pecuniary externalities associated with market incompleteness which is same as this
paper.
In this paper I focus on limited commitment instead of asymmetric information and
externality to rationalize bank capital requirements. This limited commitment friction is
introduced by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2013) to explain that bank capital, i.e. net worth, is
helpful to raise funds from depositors when private banks are not trustworthy. Williamson
(2014) develops this idea to determine the bank capital structure endogenously in his model.
In those papers bank capital can adjust the pleageability and liquidity of assets. However,
the rationale for capital requirements is first studied in the present paper.
4See also VanHoose (2007) for a literature review on banking theories with the bank capital regulations.
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The function of bank liabilities as a means of payment and settlement is also considered
with capital regulations in the previous literature. For example, Begenau (2015) shows that
bank capital requirements can, in fact, increase bank lending because the reduced supply of
bank liabilites adjusts the interest rate downwards. However, in Begenau (2015) bank capital
is held only when capital requirements are enforced. While in this paper bank capital can
be held voluntarily without bank capital requirements.
This paper builds on the literature that provides micro-foundations for monetary eco-
nomics as pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Lagos and Wright (2005). Banking
models with explicit trade frictions are developed by Freeman (1988), Champ, Smith and
Williamson (1996) and Sanches and Williamson (2010). The role of assets in exchange is stud-
ied by Geromichalos, Licari and Suarez-Lledo (2007), Lagos and Rocheteau (2008). Limited
commitment in assets-exchange is studied by Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Venkateswaren
and Wright (2013). Aggregate risk in the return of assets is introduced in Lagos (2010) to
explain the equity-premium puzzle and in Andolfatto, Berentsen and Waller (2014) to con-
sider the optimal information disclosure. Bank capital is recognized as a non-pledgeable part
of assets in Williamson (2014). But the rationale for bank capital requirements is considered
in the present paper.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the second section I describe the elements
of the model. In the third section a simple model with one risky asset is characterized and
analyzed with bank capital requirements. I introduce money and government bonds in the
fourth section to consider the relationship between bank capital requirements and monetary
policy. The final section concludes.
1.2 Model
The model structure is based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . is discrete
and the horizon is infinite. Each period is divided into two sub-periods - the centralized
7
market (CM) followed by the decentralized market (DM). There is a continuum of buyers,
sellers and bankers, each with unit mass. An individual buyer has preferences
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[−Ht + u(xt)],
where Ht ∈ R is labor supply in the CM, xt ∈ R+ is consumption in the DM, and 0 < β < 1.
Assume that u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable
with u
′
(0) =∞, u′(∞) = 0, and −xu
′′
(x)
u′ (x) = γ < 1.
5 Each seller has preferences
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt − ht],
where Xt ∈ R is consumption in the CM, and ht ∈ R+ is labor supply in the DM. An
individual banker has preferences
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt −Ht],
where Ht ∈ R+ is labor supply in the CM, Xt ∈ R+ is consumption in the CM.
Buyers can produce in the CM, but not in the DM while sellers can produce in the DM,
but not in the CM. Bankers can produce and consume in the CM, but cannot participate in
the DM. One unit of labor input produces one unit of perishable consumption good either
in the CM or in the DM.
In this economy there are two kinds of public assets, fiat money and one-period govern-
ment bonds, issued by the fiscal authority. Fiat money trades at price φt in terms of goods
in the CM of period t. One-period maturity government bonds, which are obligations to pay
one unit of fiat money in the CM of period t + 1, sell at price zt in terms of goods in the
CM of period t. There also exists one private asset - a divisible Lucas tree. It is endowed to
buyers in the CM of the initial period t = 0 with a fixed unit supply. The Lucas tree pays
5Constant relative risk aversion is useful to derive the benefit of consumption risk-sharing explicitly in
the model. It is also useful to have a unique equilibrium because the demand for assets is strictly increasing
in rates of return so that substitution effects dominate income effects when γ < 1.
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off yt units of consumption goods as a dividend and trades at the price ψt in terms of goods
in the CM of period t. The dividend of the Lucas tree, yt, is an i.i.d random variable which
can take on two possible values, 0 < yl ≤ yh < ∞. Let pi denote the probability of a high
dividend yh, and let y¯ ≡ piyh + (1− pi)yl as an expected payoff of this random dividend.
In the beginning of the period t CM, all agents meet and debts or obligations are paid
off. Buyers receive lump-sum transfer (or pay lump-sum tax) and the holders of the Lucas
tree receive the dividends. Then a Walrasian market opens, goods are produced, assets are
traded and buyers deposit goods or assets into a banker with a contingent deposit contract.
The asset market is closed and the next period t+ 1 dividend of the Lucas tree is known in
the end of the period t CM.
In the DM each buyer meets each seller bilaterally and the terms of trade are deter-
mined by bargaining. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. There is no
record-keeping technology in the DM so that agents are anonymous. Limited commitment
is assumed so that no one can be forced to work. Thus no unsecured credit is available,
recognizable assets are essential for trade, and trade must be quid pro quo.
Similar to Sanches and Williamson (2010), there are two kinds of random matches in the
DM. In a fraction ρ of non-monitored DM meetings fiat money is only recognized by sellers.
In 1 − ρ fraction of monitored DM meetings the entire asset portfolio held by the buyer
can be verified by the seller so that a secured credit arrangement is available for trade. I
assume that fiat money, i.e. currency, is portable and can be used on the spot in the DM
while the other assets are not.6 Thus deposit claims backed by the assets can be used on the
spot to transfer account balances of the buyer to the seller in the monitored DM meetings.
Since deposit claims issued by buyers or sellers can violate no record-keeping environment in
the DM, I assume that a representative banker provides a banking arrangement by issuing
deposit claims.7 Note that perfect competition is assumed among the bankers so that a
6Even if buyers can use their asset holdings directly for the trade, there is no more benefit from the direct
asset-trade because a banker provides the optimal arrangement for buyers with zero profit.
7Since bankers have a linear utility function the same as buyers and sellers in the CM, there is no more
advantage for using deposit claims of a banker than deposit claims of the other agents.
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banker suggests a deposit contract that provides the maximum expected value of depositors.
Given no memory and limited commitment, the banker can abscond in the next CM, but
the backed assets would be seized and transferred to the seller.8 Thus the asset portfolio
except for currency can be pledged as collateral as shown in Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) or
Venkateswaran and Wright (2013). One difference from their models is that the pledgeability
of the assets can be chosen by imposing contingent bank capital requirements. Thus when
a representative banker offers a contingent deposit contract, in which the payoff of deposit
claims can vary by states, a proportion of the assets which backs the deposit claims can be
adjusted by imposing bank capital requirements.9
When the contract term is arranged buyers do not know what types of meeting they will
be in during the next DM. Thus the banking contract also provides liquidity insurance as
shown in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Assume that the size of shock ρ is exactly observable
and type is public information. Thus I can set aside the bank runs issue. After type is
realized, type 1 buyers who will move to ρ non-monitored meetings can withdraw currency
from the banker when they meet the banker. Type 2 buyers who will move to 1−ρ monitored
meetings remain with deposit claims. To support the banking arrangement I assume that
the buyer can meet only one banker in the CM after their liquidity shock is realized.10
The timing is as follows. In the beginning of CM debts are paid off and all buyers
provide labor and trade assets and write a contract with a banker in a Walrasian market.
After liquidity shock is realized buyers learn their type and ρ buyers meet the banker to
withdraw money. In the end of CM the dividend for the next period is known for everyone.
In the DM buyers meet sellers randomly in the bilateral meeting and make take-it-or-leave-it
offers. In the next CM 1 − ρ sellers can receive CM goods by redeeming deposit claims to
the banker or sell them to buyers.
8All agents are subject to the same degree of limited commitment.
9The contract term must be state-contingent because no one knows the aggregate state when the contract
is written.
10Note that if ex post asset-trading among buyers is allowed then the banking contract is unraveled and
collapsed as shown in Jacklin (1987).
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Asset market opens Asset market closes
CMt DMt
Buyers pay debt
and receive transfer.
Buyers deposit
to a banker.
Type jt
is known.
Buyers meet
the banker.
State it+1
is known.
Buyers trade
with a seller.
Figure 1.2: Time line
1.2.1 Government
In the model the consolidated government consists of the fiscal authority and central bank.
The fiscal authority issues one-period nominal government bonds in the CM and pays inter-
ests in the next CM. The monetary authority issues fiat money and injects (or absorbs) fiat
money in the markets by exchanging fiat money with government bonds, i.e. open market
operations. In addition, the fiscal authority can collect a lump-sum tax from buyers (or
provide a transfer to buyers) in the CM.11 In period t = 0 government bonds are issued and
fiat money is injected with lump-sum transfer, τ0, and in the following periods outstand-
ing fiat money and government bonds are supported by tax or transfer over time. So the
consolidated government budget constraint for t = 0 is
φ0(M0 + z0B0) = τ0,
and for t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
φt{Mt −Mt−1 + ztBt −Bt−1} = τt
where Mt and Bt denote the nominal quantities of outstanding fiat money and government
bonds held in the private sector in time t, respectively, and τt denote the real value of the
lump-sum transfer to each buyer in period t. The government can impose exogenous bank
capital requirements to the bankers.
11Tax or transfer is available only for consumption goods.
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1.3 Competitive Equilibrium with Lucas tree
In the model a representative banker is assumed to provide a liquidity management service
to depositors. Given the aggregate risk the asset holdings can be valuable when the supply
of assets is insufficient, but costly when the supply of assets is abundant. A banking ar-
rangement can manage this liquidity provision problem by using a contingent bank capital
claim. By providing a proportion of assets to a banker or the other agents when the assets
are abundant and providing nothing when the assets are scarce, the liquidity for depositors
can be managed efficiently. In this section this contingent banking arrangement is considered
to maximize the expected utility of depositors. The optimal banking arrangement can be
described as bank capital is held voluntarily even though bank capital is costly to hold.
In the subsections I explore in what circumstance bank capital requirements can improve
welfare. Bank capital requirements require additional bank capital holdings for bankers,
which restrict the amount of liquidity for depositors in the economy. Thus these capital
requirements are not helpful for liquidity provision in general. However, given the aggregate
risk, bank capital requirements can be beneficial for smoothing the amount of liquidity across
states. When the ex ante asset price reflects the liquidity premium in two states, restricting
the liquidity in one state can increase the liquidity in the other state since the asset price is
changed by the adjusted liquidity premium in both states.
To focus on these two main ideas in this section I assume that there is no government
assets and no reason for liquidity insurance by ρ = 0. Under perfect competition bankers sug-
gest a contingent contract to maximize buyers’ ex ante expected value. Thus in equilibrium
a banker solves the following problem in the CM of period t:
Max
dt,at,xht ,x
l
t
− dt + piu(xht ) + (1− pi)u(xlt) (1.1)
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subject to
dt − ψtat + pi{β(ψt+1 + yh)at − xht }+ (1− pi){β(ψ + yl)at − xlt} ≥ 0 (1.2)
β(ψt+1 + y
h)at − xht ≥ 0 (1.3)
β(ψt+1 + y
l)at − xlt ≥ 0 (1.4)
dt, at, x
h
t , x
l
t ≥ 0 (1.5)
All quantities in (1.1)-(1.5) are expressed in units of the CM good in time t. The problem
(1.1) subject to (1.2)-(1.5) states that a contingent banking contract (dt, x
h
t , x
l
t) is chosen
in equilibrium to maximize the expected utility of a representative buyer subject to the
participation constraint for the banker (1.2) and the incentive constraints for the banker by
states (1.3)-(1.4) and non-negativity constraints (1.5). In (1.1)-(1.5) dt denotes the quantity
of goods deposited by the buyer, at denotes the demand of the banker for asset holdings, and
xit represents the consumption level of the buyer in each state i for i = h, l. The quantity on
the left side of (1.2) is the net payoff for bankers. In the CM of time t the banker receives
dt consumption goods, issues a deposit claim, and invests in the private asset with market
prices, ψtat. In the following CM the banker pays x
h
t or x
l
t to the holders of the deposit claim
by the state h or l. The incentive constraints (1.3)-(1.4) imply that when deposit claims are
paid off, the net payoff for the banker is greater than zero, the value that the banker could
earn when he or she decides to abscond.
Note that if the limited commitment constraints (1.3) or (1.4) does not bind then bank
capital, i.e., asset portfolio minus deposit, is strictly positive in (1.2) because the ex ante
profit for bankers must be zero under perfect competition. As well, note that since a state-
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contingent contract is considered in the problem, the banker can also choose a non-contingent
contract as an optimal choice, if needed.
Government can impose contingent bank capital requirements (δh, δl) in which a banker
must set aside at least δi ∈ [0, 1) proportion of the asset portfolio by the state i. Then we
can have additional bank capital constraints by states,
β(ψt+1 + y
h)(1− δh)at − xht ≥ 0 (1.6)
β(ψt+1 + y
l)(1− δl)at − xlt ≥ 0 (1.7)
where the deposit claim is only pledgeable by 1− δi proportion of the assets in the state i.
Note that for δi = 0 the bank capital constraints (1.6)-(1.7) are simply same with the
limited commitment constraints (1.3)- (1.4), respectively. For δi ∈ (0, 1) if the bank capital
constraints (1.6)-(1.7) do not bind, the limited commitment constraints (1.3)-(1.4) always do
not bind while if the bank capital constraints (1.6)-(1.7) bind then the limited commitment
constraints (1.3)-(1.4) are relaxed, respectively. Thus given δi ∈ [0, 1) an equilibrium can
be constructed only with the bank capital constraints (1.6)-(1.7) that replace the limited
commitment constraints (1.3)-(1.4) without loss of generality. Notice that bank capital
requirements, δh and δl, are choice variables of government, thus no bank capital requirements
with δh = δl = 0 can also be chosen at the optimum.
The first step is to solve the problem (1.1) subject to (1.2),(1.5)-(1.7) to characterize
equilibrium. The constraint (1.2) must bind, as the objective function is strictly increasing in
both xht and x
l
t while (1.2) is strictly decreasing in both x
h
t and x
l
t. Since I will concentrate on
the cases either constraint (1.6) or (1.7) binds, let λh and λl denote the multiplier associated
with the incentive constraints (1.6) and (1.7), respectively. Then by plugging (1.2) into (1.1)
we have the first-order conditions by at, x
h
t , x
l
t,
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ψt = piβ(ψt+1 + y
h){1 + λh(1− δh)}+ (1− pi)β(ψt+1 + yl){1 + λl(1− δl)}, (1.8)
pi{u′(xht )− 1} = λh, (1.9)
(1− pi){u′(xlt)− 1} = λl (1.10)
which can be reduced to
ψt = piβ(ψt+1 + y
h){(1− δh)u′(xht ) + δh}+ (1− pi)β(ψt+1 + yl){(1− δl)u
′
(xlt) + δ
l} (1.11)
The first-order condition (1.11) states that the net payoff to the banker from acquiring
one unit of the asset is zero in equilibrium. In equilibrium a representative bank holds all
the assets in its portfolio so that the asset market clear in the CM with
at = 1 (1.12)
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The market clearing condition (1.12) states that the supply of the private
asset is equal to the banker’s demand.
Definition 1.1. Given (pi, yh, yl) and bank capital requirements (δh, δl), a stationary com-
petitive equilibrium consists of quantities (xh, xl) and asset price ψ and multipliers
(λh, λl) which satisfy equations (1.6)-(1.10), (1.12).
Note that there are five variables to be determined in a stationary equilibrium in Def-
inition 1.1 and five equations with the asset market clearing condition are provided. Thus
equilibrium allocations are determined by given parameters and bank capital requirements.
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From now on I will eliminate t subscripts to restrict the attention to stationary equilibrium
allocations.
1.3.1 No Bank Capital Requirements
In this subsection I characterize the equilibrium allocations with no bank capital require-
ments, δh = δl = 0, as a benchmark. Then it will matter for the determination of equilibrium
whether the incentive constraints (1.3)-(1.4) bind or not. Thus I will consider each of the
three relevant equilibrium cases: Neither constraint binds; the constraint for state l only
binds; both constraints bind. Note that there is no equilibrium case in which the constraint
for state h only binds since yh ≥ yl is assumed given δh = δl = 0.
Neither constraint binds In this case, since λh = λl = 0, from (1.8)-(1.10) we have
ψ = ψf and xl = xh = x∗ in equilibrium where ψf ≡ βy¯1−β and x∗ satisfies with u
′
(x∗) =
1. The quantity of bank deposits, d, is fixed as x∗ in the participation constraint (1.2)
since (1.2) holds with equality in equilibrium. The efficient allocation, i.e. the first-best
allocation, is attained when both incentive constraints do not bind. That means, given
limited commitment, if the supply of the asset is sufficient in an economy, the efficient
allocation can be supported. Given δh = δl = 0 if the incentive constraint for state l (1.4)
does not bind then the incentive constraint for state h (1.3) does not bind as well. Thus it
is required to have
β(ψf + yl)− x∗ ≥ 0 (1.13)
to support the efficient allocation as equilibrium. Equation (1.13), which can be trans-
formed into βyl + β2pi(yh− yl) ≥ (1− β)x∗, implies that the efficient allocation is attainable
in equilibrium as the expected payoff of the dividend is large enough given the aggregate
risk, i.e. yh − yl. This equilibrium is described as region 1 in Figure 1.3.
Note that holding an asset is not costly in this case since the real return of the asset is
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the same as the inverse value of time preference with ψ
f+y¯
ψf
= 1
β
. Thus the bank capital, the
asset holdings minus bank deposits, is determined as ψf − x∗. But it is not costly to hold
bank capital in this case.
The constraint for state l only binds In this case since λl > λh = 0, (4) and (8) can
be transformed into
β(ψ + yl)− xl = 0 (1.14)
and
ψ = piβ(ψ + yh) + (1− pi)β(ψ + yl)u′(xl), (1.15)
respectively. Then the incentive constraint (1.14) and the first-order condition (1.15)
solve for ψ and xl in equilibrium. Since the incentive constraint for state l binds, the
consumption level in state l is lower than the optimal level, xl < x∗ and a liquidity premium
in the asset price arises so that the asset price is greater than its fundamental value, ψ > ψf
, in equilibrium with u
′
(xl) > 1. Since the incentive constraint for the state h (1.3) does not
bind we have xh = x∗ in equilibrium.12 The quantity of bank deposits, d, is determined as
ψ−pi{β(ψ+ yh)−x∗} in the participation (1.2) while the bank capital is pi{β(ψ+ yh)−x∗}
which is at least positive. Note that both bank deposits and bank capital increase in ψ.
This is because when the incentive constraint binds, the asset price rises so that the balance
sheet of the banker expands. Additionally, note that even though assets are plentiful in the
state h, the asset price, ψ, is greater than its fundamental value, ψf , because the asset price,
which is determined before the state is realized, also reflects the liquidity premium in the
state l.
In this case, since there exists a liquidity premium in the asset price, the real return
of the asset is lower than the inverse value of time preference with ψ+y¯
ψ
< 1
β
. This implies
12This case can be generalized with a continuous distribution for dividends. If the variance of dividend
distribution is large enough then we will have a measure of h state in which the incentive constraint does
not bind.
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that holding the asset is costly and so is holding bank capital. However, the bank capital is
voluntarily held by the banker in equilibrium since the marginal benefit of holding assets in
the state h ex post is lower than the marginal cost of acquiring the asset ex ante. When the
state h is realized the marginal benefit of holding extra assets, i.e. the total value of asset
portfolio minus the asset used for trade - β(ψ + yh)− x∗, is lower than one. This is because
the marginal utility of consumption with those extra assets is lower than one with u
′
(x∗) = 1.
But the marginal cost of acquiring total asset portfolio is one because the marginal utility
of labor supply or consumption good in the CM is fixed as one in this quasi-linear model.
In order to maximize the depositor’s expected value the banker will not let depositors hold
these extra assets in the state h ex post. Since the profit of the banker is always zero in
equilibrium, it is optimal for the banker to hold bank capital for depositors even though it
is costly.13 As a consequence bank capital, which is costly to hold, is determined as strictly
positive in equilibrium. This implies that bank capital, which is not useful for trade, needs
to be held for efficient liquidity management when there exists an aggregate risk in assets
and the limited commitment constraint binds.
For this to be an equilibrium, ψ and xl must satisfy with
β(ψ + yh)− x∗ ≥ 0. (1.16)
This implies that given the aggregate risk when the expected payoff of the dividend is
small, but the incentive constraint for the state h does not bind, this equilibrium case is
feasible. It is described as region 2 in Figure 1.3.
Both constraints bind In this case, since λl > 0, λh > 0, the incentive constraint for the
state h (1.3) and the first-order condition (1.8) can be transformed into
13Even though the bankers are risk-averse this logic can be applied similarly. The banker will hold extra
assets as a bank capital in equilibrium as long as the marginal benefit of holding assets in the state h ex
post is the same as the marginal cost of holding assets ex ante.
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β(ψ + yh)− xh = 0 (1.17)
and
ψ = piβ(ψ + yh)u
′
(xh) + (1− pi)β(ψ + yl)u′(xl), (1.18)
respectively. Then the incentive constraints (1.14) and (1.17), and the first-order condi-
tion (1.18) solve for ψ, xh, and xl in equilibrium. Since both incentive constraints bind, the
consumption level in the state l is lower than that in the state h, xl < xh, as long as yl < yh
holds, and a liquidity premium in the asset price arises so that the asset price is greater
than its fundamental value, ψ > ψf . The quantity of bank deposits, d, is determined as
ψ in the participation constraint (1.2) while the bank capital is zero because both incentive
constraint bind. The bank capital would not be held by the banker because even in the
state h the supply of assets is too scarce so that the marginal benefit of holding the asset is
greater than one with u
′
(xh) > 1. Note that bank deposits increases in ψ as well, but bank
capital is fixed as zero in this case because the dividends are too small. When the expected
payoff of the dividend is too low given the aggregate risk, this equilibrium case is attainable
and it is described as region 3 in Figure 1.3.
In Figure 1.3 region 1 and region 2 are separated by a straight line, i.e. equation (1.13)
with equality. The curve between region 2 and 3 is drawn on the points where xh = x∗ just
holds with zero bank capital in equilibrium. Thus the incentive constraint for the state h
(1.16) holds with equality on this curve. Note that at yh = yl region 2 vanishes since the
two incentive constraints collapse into one constraint. Thus if there is no aggregate risk then
there is no reason to hold costly bank capital for the banker in equilibrium. The dotted
line in region 2 indicates the points that provide the same expected payoff of dividends with
y¯ = piyh + (1− pi)yl. This line is located below the borderline between region 1 and 2. It is
because given the same level of y¯, the incentive constraint for the state l (1.4) is constrained
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Figure 1.3: Regions with No Bank Capital Requirements
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by the lower value of yl as the aggregate risk increases. Given the same expected payoff of
dividend, when the aggregate risk increases the equilibrium allocation moves parallel to the
dotted line.
1.3.2 Bank Capital Requirements
In this subsection I consider in what circumstance bank capital requirements can improve
welfare. Given the contingent bank capital requirements, we can set either δh > 0 or δl > 0.
If symmetric bank capital requirements with δ = δh = δl > 0 are enforced then the welfare
of the equilibrium allocation becomes worse. This is because the symmetric bank capital
requirements have the same effect of reducing the supply of assets from one to 1− δ. Thus
the consumption levels in both states strictly decrease when the symmetric bank capital
requirements are implemented. Then we can consider two asymmetric capital requirements,
either δh > δl = 0 or δl > δh = 0.14 In the following I focus on the bank capital requirements
with δh > δl = 0 to verify whether these requirements can be beneficial or not, and to show
that the bank capital requirements with δl > δh = 0 cannot improve welfare. From now
on I assume that δl = 0 and replace δh with δ. Since the equilibrium allocation is already
efficient in region 1, I restrict our attention to the regions 2 and 3.
No Aggregate Risk Let me begin with a special case, in which there is no aggregate
risk with yh = yl = y¯, in order to know the benefit of bank capital requirements. Since the
aggregate risk is diversified, the consumption levels in both states are equal as xl = xh ≡ x
in equilibrium. Then the first-order condition (1.11) can be transformed into
ψ = β(ψ + y¯)u
′
(x), (1.19)
and the incentive constraints (1.3) and (1.4) collapse to one incentive constraint. This
14In case of δh > δl > 0 or δl > δh > 0 we can improve the welfare by subtracting δl or δh in both capital
requirements, respectively.
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constraint can be written as
β(ψ + y¯)(1− δ)− x ≥ 0 (1.20)
with asset market clearing condition, a = 1, in equilibrium. Since we are not interested
in the equilibrium case of region 1, suppose that the bank capital constraint (1.20) binds
with δ = 0. The bank capital constraint (1.20) states that if δ > 0 then the deposit claim is
backed only by 1− δ proportion of the assets. Given δ, the first-order condition (1.19) and
the incentive constraint (1.20) with equality solves for ψ and x in equilibrium. Note that the
equilibrium allocation is uniquely determined because ψ is strictly decreasing in x in (1.19)
and strictly increasing in x in (1.20).
Lemma 1.2. If there is no aggregate risk and the incentive constraint binds, the welfare is
strictly decreasing in δ.
Proof. If the incentive constraint (1.20) binds then x > 0 solves for x(1−βu′(x)) = (1−δ)βy¯
in equilibrium. Since 1− βu′(x) is strictly increasing in x, x is strictly decreasing in δ

Lemma 1.2 states that given limited commitment, if there is no aggregate risk then
bank capital requirements cannot be beneficial. If bank capital requirements are effective in
equilibrium, the banker needs to hold more capital than he/she would choose. Thus as long
as holding assets is costly, bank capital requirements have a negative effect on the welfare by
reducing the proportion of the assets which is useful for trade. Moreover, there is no positive
effect of bank capital requirements on the welfare in this case. Note that in this case bank
capital requirements are not contingent. They always restrict a fixed δ proportion of the
asset. In this respect the reason that bank capital requirements cannot be beneficial in this
case can also be explained by the case of the symmetric bank capital requirements.
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Aggregate Risk Now consider a general case in which there exists an aggregate risk with
yh > yl. Note that equilibrium in region 2 and equilibrium in region 3 are almost the
same except for that there exists a strictly positive bank capital in region 2. So I analyze
primarily whether the welfare of the equilibrium in region 2 can be improved by bank capital
requirements. The same argument can be applied for the equilibrium in region 3.
Suppose that an equilibrium in region 2 exists with a strictly positive bank capital given
δ = 0. Then there exists a threshold δ˜ > 0 at which the bank capital constraint (1.6) starts
to bind; At δ = δ˜ we still have ψ = ψf and x
h = x∗ in equilibrium and (1.6) holds with
equality. Thus δ˜ requires to satisfy with
β(ψ + yh)(1− δ˜)− x∗ = 0 (1.21)
where ψ and xl are the solution of the incentive constraint (1.14) and the first-order
condition (1.15). By construction, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ˜ bank capital requirements are not effective
in real allocations because (1.3) does not bind. Thus the equilibrium allocation is the same
as one with δ = 0 and only bank capital is decreasing in δ. As a result, bank capital
requirements are not beneficial for 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ˜ in region 2.
For δ > δ˜ bank capital requirements are effective in real allocations since the bank capital
constraint (1.6) binds. In this case the first-order condition (1.11) can be written as
ψ = piβ(ψ + yh){(1− δ)u′(xh) + δ}+ (1− pi)β(ψ + yl)u′(xl) (1.22)
which can be rearranged to
pixh{u′(xh)+ δ
1− δ}+(1−pi)x
lu
′
(xl) =
piβyh{(1− δ)u′(xh) + δ}+ (1− pi)βylu′(xl)
1− βpi{(1− δ)u′(xh) + δ} − (1− pi)βu′(xl) (1.23)
Note that the left-hand side of (1.23) is strictly increasing in xh and in xl because
−xu
′′
(x)
u′ (x) = γ < 1 while the left-hand side of (1.23) is strictly decreasing in x
h and in xl.
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Thus we can rewrite (1.23) in the form of
F (xh, xl, δ) = 0, (1.24)
where the function F (· , · ) is strictly increasing in both arguments xh, xl given δ. Then
the first-order condition (1.23) can be describe as the FOC curve in Figure 1.4.
Meanwhile, the two binding constraints (1.6) and (1.4) can be written with equality,
β(ψ + yh)(1− δ)− xh = 0 (1.25)
and
β(ψ + yl)− xl = 0, (1.26)
respectively. Note that we have xh < x∗ in equilibrium. Binding incentive constraints (25)
and (26) can be reduced to
β(yh − yl) = x
h
1− δ − x
l (1.27)
where (27) can be described as the IC curve in Figure 1.4.
Note that the function F (· , · ) is strictly increasing in δ given xh and xl, because the
left-hand side is strictly decreasing in δ whereas the right-hand side is strictly increasing in
δ given xh and xl. Thus when δ increases the FOC curve shifts towards the origin from
FOC1 to FOC2 as shown in Figure 1.4. On the other hand, as δ increases the IC curve (27)
rotates counter-clockwise from IC1 to IC2 as shown in Figure 1.4. By rotating the IC curve
xh and xl moves towards the 45 degree line where the consumption levels in both states are
equal. Thus the bank capital requirement in the state h can show that the consumption risk
can be shared across the states.15
15Note that when δ increases, xh decreases in equilibrium, but we need to confirm that xl can increase
and the welfare can improve.
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Figure 1.4: Risk-sharing with Bank Capital Requirements
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Let me briefly discuss that the bank capital requirements with δl > δh = 0 cannot be
beneficial. Suppose that the same equilibrium in region 2 exists with a strictly positive bank
capital given δl = δh = 0 as above. If the bank capital requirements with δl > δh = 0 are
implemented, then for δl > 0 bank capital requirements are effective immediately. But since
the incentive constraint for state h (1.16) remains relaxed with xh = x∗ there is no benefit for
consumption risk-sharing. It can be also confirmed by the following equilibrium conditions
in which the first-order condition and the incentive constraint can be transformed into the
bank capital requirements with δl > δh = 0 into,
pixhu
′
(xh) + (1− pi)xl{u′(xl) + δ
l
1− δl} =
piβyhu
′
(xh) + (1− pi)βyl{(1− δl)u′(xl) + δl}
1− piβyhu′(xh)− (1− pi)βyl{(1− δl)u′(xl) + δl}
(1.28)
and
β(yh − yl) = xh − x
l
1− δl , (1.29)
respectively. Note that when δl increases the first-order condition (1.28) moves into the
origin as well, but the incentive constraint (1.29) rotates clockwise. Thus xh and xl shifts
away from the 45 degree line so that it is worse even in a view of consumption risk-sharing.
Hence the bank capital requirements with δl > δh = 0 cannot be beneficial.
Now I return to our main subject that the bank capital requirement in the state h with
δh ≡ δ > δ˜ can be beneficial when the benefit of consumption risk-sharing is greater than
the cost of holding enforced bank capital.
Lemma 1.3. There exists a unique δˆ > 0 where xh = xl at δ = δˆ in equilibrium.
Proof. As δ → 1, the equilibrium allocation approaches to (0, x¯l) where x¯l = min(x∗, xl)
such that xl satisfies with the first-order condition (1.23) and the equilibrium condition
(1.27) given xh = 0 and δ = 1 as shown in Figure 1.4. Note that the solution of
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this constrained maximization problem is continuous in δ since u and u
′
is continuous.
Thus as shown in Figure 1.4, by the Intermediate Value theorem, there exists a point
that xh = xl holds at δ = δˆ ∈ (δ˜, 1) in equilibrium. This point is unique because when
δ increases xh strictly decreases
Lemma 1.3 is helpful to earn Proposition 1.4. It states that as δ approaches to 1, xh and
xl must pass the 45 degree line in which the consumption risk is perfectly shared. Thus we
can just compare the point A with the point B in the Figure 1.4, because the welfare of the
equilibrium located in the upper side of the 45 degree line is lower than the welfare of the
point B. Note that the contract at δ = δˆ is a non-contingent debt contract because xh = xl
holds in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.4. In region 2 the optimal bank capital requirement δ∗ exists in (δ˜, δˆ] when
agents are sufficiently risk-averse with γ > γ∗.
Proof. Given δ = δˆ, xˆ ≡ xh = xl holds in equilibrium by construction. Then from the
first-order condition (1.22) and the binding constraint (1.26), in equilibrium xˆ must
satisfies with
1
β
xˆ− yl = ψˆ = xˆu′(xˆ) + pi δˆ
1− δˆ xˆ (1.30)
where ψˆ denote the asset price in the equilibrium with δ = δˆ. Since β(yh − yl) = δˆ
1−δˆ xˆ holds
from the equilibrium condition (1.27), the equation (1.30) can be transformed into
1
β
xˆ− yˆ = xˆu′(xˆ) = (1− γ)u(xˆ) (1.31)
where yˆ ≡ piβyh + (1−piβ)yl. The second equality in (1.31) is derived by −xu
′′
(x)
u′ (x) = γ. Thus
given yˆ and γ, xˆ is pinned down from (1.31). Given δ = δ˜, since the bank capital constraint
(1.6) does not bind, the equilibrium conditions (1.14)-(1.15) and (1.21) can be transformed
into
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ψ˜ = pix∗u
′
(x∗)+pix∗
δ˜
1− δ˜+(1−pi)x
lu
′
(xl) = (1−γ){piu(x∗)+(1−pi)u(xl)}+pix∗ δ˜
1− δ˜ (1.32)
where ψ˜ denote the asset price in the equilibrium with δ = δ˜, similarly. Let’s define x¯ ≡
pix∗ + (1 − pi)xl and define x˜ as a certainty equivalent value between x∗ and xl by u(x˜) ≡
piu(x∗) + (1 − pi)u(xl). Then there exists a proportion p ∈ (0, pi) which satisfies with x˜ =
p
1−δ˜x
∗ + (1− p)xl since u is strictly concave. Then (32) can be rewritten as
1
β
x˜− y˜ = ψ˜ = (1− γ){ pi
1− δ˜ u(x
∗) + (1− pi)u(xl)} = (1− γ)u(x˜) (1.33)
where y˜ ≡ pyh + (1 − p)yl. Since p is strictly decreasing in γ , x˜ decreases from x¯ to
xl as γ increases in (0,∞). Thus there exists a threshold γ∗ where x˜ = xˆ holds. Given
(pi, yh, yl), if γ > γ∗ then x˜ < xˆ. Finally, the welfare function in the equilibrium with δ = δˆ
is Wˆ = u(xˆ)− xˆ+ y¯ whereas the welfare function in the equilibrium with δ = δ˜ is expressed
as W˜ = pi{u(x∗)−x∗}+ (1−pi){u(xl)−xl}+ y¯. Since pi{u(x∗)−x∗}+ (1−pi){u(xl)−xl} ≤
pi
1−δ˜{u(x∗)−x∗}+ (1−pi){u(xl)−xl} = u(x˜)− x¯ ≤ u(x˜)− x˜ < u(xˆ)− xˆ holds, Wˆ > W˜ when
γ > γ∗. Thus the optimal bank capital requirement δ∗ exists in (δ˜, δˆ] because the welfare of
the equilibrium allocation is continuous in δ since u is continuous and the solution of the
problem is also continuous 
Corollary 1.5. In region 3 the optimal bank capital requirement δ∗ exists in (0, δˆ] when
agents are sufficiently risk-averse with γ > γ∗.
Proof When both incentive constraints (1.6) and (1.4) bind, for any δ > 0 xh is strictly
decreasing in δ because (1.6) already binds. Thus the same proof for Proposition 1 can
be applied with δ˜ = 0
Corollary 1.5 states that the same argument can apply for region 3 where the incentive
constraint for state h already binds. This is because the consumption risk is also not shared
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when both constraints bind.
Proposition 1.4 provides a sufficient condition for beneficial bank capital requirements.
Given the aggregate risk and the scarcity of assets, if the risk-aversion of depositors is greater
than a threshold, γ > γ∗, no bank capital requirements are no longer the optimal choice of
the government. This result implies that bank capital requirements should be considered
as a policy tool for consumption risk-sharing. Moreover, this result offers a justification of
imposing a procyclical capital requirement, i.e., a counter-cyclical capital buffer in Basel
III.16 A counter-cyclical capital buffer is proposed to mitigate a credit crunch by providing
a buffer in recession by accumulating bank capital in a credit boom. However, in this model
the procyclical capital requirement can also stabilize the business cycle by adjusting the asset
prices without a real transfer.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows: given the aggregate risk, the supply
of assets varies across the states. Given the asset prices a banker can manage the cost of
holding assets with bank capital. However, the consumption risk is not shared since the
real transfer across the states is hardly achieved. Bank capital requirements can be effective
to smooth consumptions by tightening the constraint in the state h which can relax the
constraint in the state l. However, this regulation includes a cost of holding an additional
bank capital and it is more costly to hold bank capital as assets are scarcer since the liquidity
premium rises further. Thus there are three factors which provide a sufficient condition for
beneficial bank capital requirements. One is the risk aversion of depositors. Since depositors
are risk-averse, they will prefer to pay more for sharing the consumption risk. Secondly, the
incentive for risk-sharing becomes stronger as the aggregate risk becomes larger. Finally, the
level of asset scarcity is also important because if assets are too scarce, then bank capital
becomes too costly to hold for risk-sharing.
Note that the market failure in the problem, which necessitates bank capital requirements,
16The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a,b) introduced a new counter-cyclical component
which varies from 0 percent to 2.5 percent at regulators’ discretion in addition to the minimum total capital
requirement.
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Figure 1.5: Regions of Welfare Improvement by Risk-Aversion
is not related to the deposit contract since a complete contingent contract is considered in the
model. It is also not associated with an externality because a representative banker provides
ex ante maximized contract to depositors under perfect competition. Thus the incentive of
the banker are well aligned with the objective of the society. The market imperfection is
caused by limited commitment. Since the transactions in the decentralized market can be
supported by the value of the collateral, if there arises a cost for holding the collateral by
the scarcity of assets, the first welfare theorem no longer applys.
The proposition 1.4 can be confirmed by a numerical example in Figure 1.5. Given
parameter values, the regions, with which the proposition 1.4 is satisfied, are indicated in
Figure 1.5. The region does not include the equilibrium cases in which assets are too scarce.
Thus the highlighted region widens as the depositors become more risk-averse.
In Figure 1.6 I show numerical examples of different equilibrium allocations: the equi-
librium allocation in the panel graphs in the top row is generated for a benchmark in which
the optimal bank capital requirement is zero. In this case when δ increases, the liquidity
risk is shared because xh falls and xl rises. But the welfare strictly decreases since the cost
of holding bank capital is greater than the benefit of sharing risk. In the panel graphs in the
second row the equilibrium allocation is changed as the total supply of assets increases.
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Figure 1.6: Welfare Improvement by Bank Capital Requirements
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In this case the welfare can improve as δ increases because the cost of holding bank capital
is lowered since the assets are less scarce. Similarly, the welfare can improve by imposing
capital requirements when the buyers become more risk-averse as shown in the panel graphs
in the third row and when the aggregate risk becomes greater as shown in the panel graphs
in the bottom row. Thus these numerical examples confirm that bank capital requirements
can be beneficial when assets are not too scarce and the depositors are sufficiently risk-averse
and finally aggregate risk is large enough.
1.4 Monetary Equilibrium
In this section I introduce money and government bonds in the model to consider how bank
capital requirements can influence the real macroeconomic variables and how they are associ-
ated with the implementation of monetary policy. In the previous section it was shown that
bank capital requirements can have an impact on the asset price by adjusting the liquidity
premium by states. Thus there is a possibility that given a fixed monetary policy, bank
capital requirements affect the inflation rate and real interest rates on assets. Conventional
monetary policy is limited at the zero-lower-bound since it is irrelevant to exchange currency
and government bonds when their prices are same. But if the real allocation can be changed
by imposing bank capital requirements then we can influence macroeconomic variables with
bank capital requirements even at the zero-lower-bound. This extension also shows what
level of nominal interest rates imply that bank capital requirements will be beneficial. Since
the currency trades in the non-monitored meetings are now activated, we should consider
the effect of bank capital requirements not only on credit arrangements, but also on currency
trades.
I assume that the dividend on assets is known after a buyer meets the banker to withdraw
currency. This assumption allows us to characterize equilibrium in a simple way because the
consumption of the buyer using currency does not depend on the state.
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A representative banker solves the following problem in the CM of period t:
Max
dt,mt,bt,at,x1t,xh2t,x
l
2t
− dt + ρu(x1) + (1− ρ){piu(xh2) + (1− pi)u(xl2)} (1.34)
subject to participation constraint
dt −mt − ztbt − ψtat + {βφt+1
φt
mt − ρx1t}+
pi{βφt+1
φt
bt + β(ψt+1 + y
h)at − (1− ρ)xh2t}+
(1− pi){βφt+1
φt
bt + β(ψt+1 + y
l)at − (1− ρ)xl2t} ≥ 0
(1.35)
and the limited commitment constraint for currency
βφt+1
φt
mt − ρx1t ≥ 0 (1.36)
and the limited commitment constraints for deposit claims by states
βφt+1
φt
bt + β(ψt+1 + y
h)at − (1− ρ)xh2t ≥ 0 (1.37)
βφt+1
φt
bt + β(ψt+1 + y
l)at − (1− ρ)xl2t ≥ 0 (1.38)
and the bank capital constraints by states
{βφt+1
φt
bt + β(ψt+1 + y
h)at}(1− δh)− (1− ρ)xh2t ≥ 0 (1.39)
{βφt+1
φt
bt + β(ψt+1 + y
l)at}(1− δl)− (1− ρ)xl2t ≥ 0 (1.40)
and non-negative constraints
dt,mt, bt, at, x1t, x
h
2t, x
l
2t ≥ 0 (1.41)
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All quantities in (1.34)-(1.41) are expressed in units of the CM good in period t. The
problem states that a contingent banking contract is chosen in equilibrium to maximize the
expected utility of a buyer (1.34) subject to constraints (1.35)-(1.41). In (1.34)-(1.41), mt
and bt denote the quantities of money and government bonds in terms of the CM good in
period t held by the banker and xijt denote the consumption of type j buyers in the state i
in time t CM for j ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ {h, l}. Unlike the secured credit arrangement, currency
transactions of type 1 buyers are fully backed by real money balances with no risk in (1.36).
Note that given the liquidity shock ρ ∈ (0, 1) this banking contract provides not only liquidity
provision service by using deposit claims, but also liquidity insurance for each type.
From now on I focus on a stationary equilibrium where φt+1
φt
= 1
µ
holds for all t, and
µ denote the gross inflation rate. Moreover, we will restrict our attention to the cases in
which the first-best allocation is infeasible. Then the participation constraint (1.35) and
the incentive constraint for currency trade (1.36) and the incentive constraint for the state l
(1.38) always bind, while the incentive constraint for the state h (1.37) may bind or not. In
order to know whether the same argument for consumption risk-sharing can also be applied
in this extended model I focus on the bank capital requirement in the high-return state,
δh. So from now on let δ replace δh as we did in the previous section. As discussed in
the previous section given δ ∈ [0, 1) equilibrium can be constructed with the bank capital
constraint (1.39) instead of the limited commitment constraint (1.37).
Without loss of generality, the first-order conditions by m, b, a can be attained as
µ
β
= u
′
(x1) (1.42)
z
µ
β
= pi{(1− δ)u′(xh2) + δ}+ (1− pi)u
′
(xl2) (1.43)
ψ = β(ψ + yh)pi{(1− δ)u′(xh2) + δ}+ β(ψ + yl)(1− pi)u
′
(xl2) (1.44)
Incentive constraints (1.36),(1.38)-(1.39) can be rewritten by dropping t subscripts as
34
βµ
m = ρx1 (1.45)
{β
µ
b+ β(ψ + yh)a}(1− δ) ≥ (1− ρ)xh2 (1.46)
β
µ
b+ β(ψ + yl)a = (1− ρ)xl2 (1.47)
Note that if the bank capital constraint (1.46) does not bind, bank capital is strictly positive
in equilibrium. In equilibrium asset markets clear in the CM for all t, so that the demands
of the representative banker for currency, government bonds, and private assets are equal
to the supplies of outstanding government assets and the fixed unit supply of Lucas tree,
respectively, as
mt = φtMt, (1.48)
bt = φtBt, (1.49)
at = 1 (1.50)
I assume that the fiscal authority keeps the total value of the outstanding consolidated
government debt, V , constant forever. This requires a transfer τ0 = V at t = 0. Then from
the consolidated budget constraints we obtain the real term of lump-sum transfer,
τt = (1− 1
µ
)V︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
1
µ
(z − 1)b︸ ︷︷ ︸ , t = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
seigniorage real interest payment
(1.51)
where τt is required to maintain the constant value of V for the consolidated government debt
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in every period. Note that the lump-sum transfer consists of seigniorage from inflation and
real interest payment for government bonds. This fixed real value of consolidated government
debt assumption allows us to separate monetary policy, specifically open market operations,
from fiscal policy. Moreover, by assuming V as being small, we can explore the cases in
which the first-best allocation is infeasible.
Since the policy rule of the fiscal authority for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . is fixed, all we need to
consider for constructing equilibrium is the government budget constraint for t = 0 with
τ0 = V ,
m+ zb = V (1.52)
Definition 1.6. Given (pi, yh, yl, ρ, V ) and the nominal interest rate 1
z
− 1, bank capital re-
quirements (δh, δl), a stationary monetary equilibrium consists of quantities (x1, x
h
2 , x
l
2),
asset price ψ, inflation rate µ, and multipliers (λ1, λ2, λ3) which solve equations (1.42)-
(1.47),(1.50),(1.52).
Since we have eight unknown variables with only seven equations in the Definition 1.6,
in order to determine an equilibrium one of the two variables, inflation rate µ and the price
of government bonds z, is required to be a policy variable. I assume that the central bank
chooses the nominal interest rate target, 1
z
− 1, and implements open market operations
to achieve its goal in the model. Note that the nominal interest rate of government bonds
cannot be negative, i.e. z ≤ 1, in equilibrium.
1.4.1 No Bank Capital Requirements
In this subsection I describe the equilibrium cases without bank capital requirements as
a benchmark and explain how bank capital holdings can be changed by monetary policy.
Suppose that there are no bank capital requirements, i.e. δ = 0. I also assume that the
supply of public assets is not restricted to support ρ portion of currency transactions,
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V ≥ ρx∗. (1.53)
We have three equilibrium cases which are similar to the regions we have studied in the
previous section. If private assets are plentiful in the economy with
V + β(ψf + yl) ≥ x∗ (1.54)
then the first-best allocation, the Friedman rule equilibrium allocation, is achieved with
x1 = x
l
2 = x
h
2 = x
∗, µ = β, and ψ = ψf which corresponds to the region 1 equilibrium
in the previous section. If private assets are scarce, (1.54) violates. Thus in equilibrium
both the incentive constraint for currency transactions (1.45) and the incentive constraint
for the state l (1.47) bind for sure. But the incentive constraint for the state h (1.46) may
bind or not. If (1.46) does not bind then we have the region 2 equilibrium allocations with
x1 < x
∗, xl2 < x
h
2 = x
∗, µ > β and ψ > ψf . If (1.46) binds then we have the region 3
equilibrium allocation with x1 < x
∗, xl2 < x
h
2 < x
∗, µ > β and ψ > ψf . Note that if (1.46)
does not bind, given δ = 0 bank capital is strictly positive in region 2 from the binding
participation constraint (1.35). For the same reason bank capital is zero in region 3 when
(1.46) binds.
In order to know how these equilibrium cases are associated with monetary policy I
characterize equilibrium in region 2 and regions 3 as follows. The first-order conditions,
(1.42) and (1.43), can be reduced to
zu
′
(x1) = piu
′
(xh2) + (1− pi)u
′
(xl2) (1.55)
and binding constraints (1.45) and (1.47), the first-order condition for the private assets
(1.44), and the market clearing conditions (1.50) and (1.52) can be transformed into a form
of incentive constraint,
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ρx1u
′
(x1) + (1− ρ)pixh2u′(xh2) + (1− ρ)(1− pi)xl2u′(xl2)
= V︸︷︷︸ + βyhpiu′(xh2) + βyl(1− pi)u′(xl2)1− β{piu′(xh2) + (1− pi)u′(xl2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
public asset private asset
(1.56)
Note that if (1.46) does not bind then (1.55) and (1.56) can be rewritten by plugging xh2 =
x∗ into the equations. If (1.46) binds, from (1.46) and (1.47) we have another equilibrium
condition,
β(yh − yl) = (1− ρ)(xh2 − xl2) (1.57)
which can be simplified to
xh2 = x
l
2 + α (1.58)
where α is defined as α ≡ β(yh−yl)
1−ρ . By plugging (1.58) into the first-order condition
(1.55) and the incentive constraint (1.56) we can describe the equilibrium allocation (x1,x
l
2)
with two curves as shown in Figure 1.7. In the FOC curve (55) xl2 is strictly increasing in
x1 while in the IC curve (1.56) x
l
2 is strictly decreasing in x1 because −xu
′′
(x)
u′ (x) < 1. Note
that xh2 can be also indicated in the plane since the distance between x
h
2 and x
l
2 is fixed as α
when (1.46) binds. So there is a threshold point (x˜1, x˜2) on the IC curve where the incentive
constraint for the state h (1.46) binds at x1 > x˜1 because x
l
2 is decreasing in x1 in (1.56).
Thus for x1 ≤ x˜1 the equilibrium allocation is determined with xh2 = x∗ so that this area
corresponds to the region 2. For x1 > x˜1 the equilibrium allocation is determined with the
binding constraint (1.46) with xh2 < x
∗ so that this area corresponds to region 3 as shown in
Figure 1.6.
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Figure 1.7: Monetary Equilibrium
Given the nominal interest rate target, 1
z
−1, the equilibrium allocation (x1,xl2) is uniquely
determined from (1.55)-(1.56) and xh2 is passively derived by (1.58). As the nominal interest
rate decreases, the FOC curve shifts rightward so that x1 increases while x
h
2 and x
l
2 weakly
decrease until it arrives at the zero-lower-bound with z = 1. This mechanism can be ex-
plained as follows: when the central bank injects currency and absorbs government bonds to
lower the nominal interest rate, the real return on government bonds falls because the inef-
ficiency in the credit arrangement increases by the less-supplied government bonds, xh2 and
xl2, respectively. Meanwhile, the real return on currency, i.e. the inverse of the inflation rate,
must increase because people need to hold more real balance of currency, x1, in equilibrium.
Given this mechanism of open market operations, when the nominal interest rate falls,
bank capital in equilibrium decreases in region 2 and remains zero in region 3. Since both
incentive constraints (1.45) and (1.47) bind, bank capital is just derived from the participa-
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tion constraint (1.35) in equilibrium as pi{β
µ
b+ β(ψ+ yh)− (1− ρ)xh2} which can be reduced
to
pi{β(yh − yl) + (1− ρ)(xl2 − xh2)} (1.59)
by using (1.47). Note that bank capital described in (1.59) strictly declines as xl2 decreases
while xh2 is fixed as x
∗ in region 2. Then it becomes zero in region 3 because (1.58) holds
in equilibrium. Thus, as the nominal interest rate goes to the zero-lower-bound, the bank
capital weakly decreases in equilibrium. This happens because as the nominal interest rate
falls, the assets which support credit arragements become more scarce and so the backed
assets become scarce in the state h as well. Also note that if the aggregate risk becomes
large, then the area of region 3 shrinks while the area of region 2 expands.
Asset Yields and Liquidity Premium The real interest rate on government bonds in
equilibrium can be derived from the first-order condition for government bonds (1.43). It is
divided into the fundamental yield and the liquidity premium as
rb =
1−β{piu′ (xh2 )+(1−pi)u
′
(xl2)}
β{piu′ (xh2 )+(1−pi)u′ (xl2)}
= { 1
β
− 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸ −
{piu′(xh2) + (1− pi)u′(xl2)} − 1
β{piu′(xh2) + (1− pi)u′(xl2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental liquidity premium
(1.60)
where the liquidity premium is defined as the difference between the real interest rate
on the asset and the fundamental yield from their payoffs. For a strictly positive liquidity
premium it is necessary to have an inefficiency of credit trade in at least one state. If
the trade is efficient in the DM, the consumption is maximized with x∗ where u
′
(x∗) = 1.
Thus in the term of liquidity premium in (1.60), u
′
(xi2) > 1 reflects an inefficiency of credit
arrangement in the state i because the incentive constraint for the state i, (1.46) or (1.47),
binds. Thus as the assets are more scarce in an economy the liquidity premium on the assets
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rises. Note that the liquidity premium on government bonds also reflect the inefficiencies in
the states because the price of the government bonds are determined before the next period
return is realized.
From the first-order condition for private assets (1.44), the expected real yields on private
assets can be derived as
ra =
y¯
ψ
=
1− β{piu′(xh2) + (1− pi)u′(xl2)}
β{piu′(xh2)y
h
y¯
+ (1− pi)u′(xl2)y
l
y¯
} . (1.61)
Note that the rate of return on government bonds can be different from the rate of return
on private assets because the denominators are different in (1.60) and (1.61). Since buyers
are risk-neutral with respect to the payoff in the CM, the fundamental yields from the payoffs
of government bonds and private assets are the same. This difference in the rates of return
on those assets is generated by the difference in their liquidity premium. Let me define a
liquidity-risk premium as a proportional difference in the rates of return on two assets which
is described as
ra − rb
rb
=
β{piu′(xh2) + (1− pi)u′(xl2)}
β{piu′(xh2)y
h
y¯
+ (1− pi)u′(xl2)y
l
y¯
} . (1.62)
There are two necessary conditions to have a strictly positive liquidity-risk premium.
One is an inefficiency of trade in a state i with u
′
(xi2) > 1 which generates the liquidity
premium on the prices of both assets. If the credit arrangements in both states are efficient
then the liquidity-risk premium is zero because the fundamental yields on both assets are
the same. The other necessary condition is aggregate risk, i.e. yh > yl, which provides more
weights on the inefficiency of the state h in the denominator than in the numerator in the
liquidity-risk premium in (1.62).17 If there is no aggregate risk with yh = yl then the two
expected rates of return are the same and the liquidity-risk premium is zero in (1.62). Note
that we have rb < ra in (1.62) as long as xl2 < x
h
2 holds in equilibrium. This implies that
17The weight for the expected liquidity premium on private assets is {pi yhy¯ , (1−pi)y
l
y¯ } while the weight for
government bonds is {pi, (1− pi)}.
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given the inefficiency of credit trade in the state i and the aggregate risk, the rate of return
on private assets is greater than the rate of return on government bonds. Also, note that
given the inefficiency in both states, if the aggregate risk increases then this liquidity-risk
premium increases.
1.4.2 Bank Capital Requirements
In this subsection I consider how bank capital requirements can influence the real interest
rates of government bonds and private assets. Moreover, I study when bank capital re-
quirements is welfare-improving given a fixed monetary policy. Suppose that a bank capital
requirement, δ > 0, is imposed in the state h only. The equilibrium conditions (1.55)-(1.57)
can be modified into
zu
′
(x1) = pi{(1− δ)u′(xh2) + δ}+ (1− pi)u
′
(xl2), (1.63)
ρx1u
′
(x1) + (1− ρ)pixh2{u′(xh2) + δ1−δ}+ (1− ρ)(1− pi)xl2u
′
(xl2)
= V +
βyhpi{(1−δ)u′ (xh2 )+δ}+βyl(1−pi)u
′
(xl2)
1−β[pi{(1−δ)u′ (xh2 )+δ}+(1−pi)u′ (xl2)]
,
(1.64)
β(yh − yl) = (1− ρ)( x
h
2
1− δ − x
l
2), (1.65)
respectively. With δ > 0, the threshold point between region 2 and 3, x˜1, moves leftward
because the gap between xh2 and x
l
2 in region 3 is reduced by δ > 0 in (1.65). Thus the area
of region 3 expands while the area of region 2 shrinks.
The IC curve (1.64) does not change in region 2 because the bank capital constraint
(1.46) does not bind when δ increases. But in region 3 as δ increases, the IC curve (1.64)
can move upwards as the consumption risk is shared so that xl2 increases while x
h
2 decreases
as shown in Figure 7. Notice that the equilibrium conditions (1.64)-(1.65) are similar to
(1.22) and (1.26), respectively, except for the terms V − ρx1u′(x1) in (1.64) and 1 − ρ in
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(1.65). This implies that given x1, two curves for x
h
2 and x
l
2 can become closer in region 3 as
δ increases while the total feasible quantities of (xh2 , x
l
2) decrease by the
δ
1−δ term in (1.64)
by Proposition 1.
The FOC curve (1.63) rotates as δ increases. Since the equilibrium condition (1.65) can
be rewritten as xh2 = (1 − δ)(xl2 + α) where α = β(y
h−yl)
1−ρ , the right-side of the first-order
condition (1.63) can be transformed to (1− δ)u′((1− δ)(xl2 + α)) + δ. Then given x1 when
δ increases there is a tradeoff between an intensive margin effect and an extensive margin
effect. The intensive margin effect implies that the liquidity premium rises by the inefficiency
of trade by the reduced pledgeability whereas the extensive margin effect implies that the
liquidity premium falls because the inefficiency is only applied for the pledgeable part of the
assets.
Lemma 1.7. Given γ and x1 the FOC curve rotates since if δ increases at δ = δ˜, for
xl2 < x¯2(δ˜), x
l
2 decreases, i.e.
∂xl2
∂δ
< 0 while for xl2 > x¯2(δ), x
l
2 increases, i.e.
∂xl2
∂δ
> 0.
Proof. Given the left side of the first-order condition (1.63), zu
′
(x1), fixed, by the implicit
function theorem at δ = δ˜ we have
∂xl2
∂δ
= − pi{1− (1− γ)u
′
((1− δ˜)(xl2 + α))}
pi(1− δ˜)2(u′′((1− δ˜)(xl2 + α)) + (1− pi)u′′(xl2)
T 0. (1.66)
Since the denominator of (1.66) is strictly negative, given γ if xl2 < x¯2(δ˜) where x¯2(δ˜) satisfies
with 1 = (1−γ)u′((1− δ˜)(x¯2(δ˜) +α), then we have ∂x
l
2
∂δ
< 0 and otherwise
∂xl2
∂δ
≥ 0. Thus the
FOC curve rotates counter-clockwise with the center of x¯2(δ˜) Since currency is available to
use in both currency trade and credit arrangements, given the nominal interest rate, rates of
return on currency and government bonds must be equal in the first-order condition. Lemma
1.7 implies that when δ increases, the real interest rate on government bonds is adjusted so
that the real interest rate on currency, i.e. the inverse of the inflation rate, must also change.
Note that from (1.66) x¯2(δ) is strictly decreasing in γ. Thus when γ is sufficiently high, the
FOC curve tends to shift leftward further. Also note that x¯2(δ) is strictly increasing in δ
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from (1.66).
This result has an implication on the monetary policy. Since the FOC curve can shift
leftward by imposing bank capital requirements, the feasible set of equilibrium allocation
by choosing monetary policy can be shrunk. For example, the initial allocation x1 and the
inflation rate µ, which is feasible with z = 1 and δ = 0, can be no longer feasible with z = 1
and δ > 0 if the FOC curve moves leftward.
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Figure 1.8: Monetary Equilibrium with Bank Capital Requirements
Asset Yields and Liquidity Premium In this subsection I consider how bank capital
requirements can influence the inflation rate and real interest rates on assets in equilibrium.
Let me divide the cases by the direction of x1 in equilibrium when δ increases. Remember
in region 2 the equilibrium allocation does not change until the incentive constraint for the
state h binds. Thus, suppose that given monetary policy fixed, the equilibrium allocation
exists in region 3. When δ increases the IC curve (1.64) shifts upwards in region 3 and the
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FOC curve (1.63) rotates. If x1 is maintained as before then by the first-order condition
for currency trade (1.42) the inflation rate does not change. Since the nominal interest rate
is fixed, the real interest rate on government bonds does not change either from (1.43) and
(1.60). However, the real interest rate on private assets decreases because the liquidity-risk
premium with δ > 0 in (1.67) decreases. In (1.67) the numerator does not change since z and
x1 are maintained in the first-order condition (1.63). But the denominator increases because
when δ is raised, xl2 increases in equilibrium so that u
′
(xl2) decreases whereas (1−δ)u′(xh2)+δ
increases. As a result rb remains at its original level while ra adjusts downward.
ra − rb
rb
=
β[pi{(1− δ)u′(xh2) + δ}+ (1− pi)u′(xl2)]
β[pi{(1− δ)u′(xh2) + δ}y
h
y¯
+ (1− pi)u′(xl2)y
l
y¯
]
(1.67)
Similarly, when δ increases if x1 is determined at the lower level of the original x1, the
inflation rate goes up so that the real return of government bonds decreases. Then the
real return on private assets also decreases because both the liquidity-risk premium and the
real interest rate on government bonds decreases. Finally, if x1 is determined at the higher
level of the original x1, the inflation rate falls and the real interest rate on government
bonds increases. Then the direction of the real interest rate on private assets is ambiguous
because the liquidity-risk premium decreases while the real interest rate on government bonds
increases.
This result implies that given a fixed monetary policy, bank capital requirements can
adjust real interest rates on government bonds and private assets in equilibrium. This
means that bank capital requirements can also be effective at the zero-lower-bound where
monetary policy is limited to lower the real interest rates further. In this respect bank capital
requirements can also be considered as an unconventional policy option at the zero-lower-
bound.
Welfare-improving Bank Capital Requirements In this subsection I analyze when
bank capital requirements will be beneficial given a fixed monetary policy. As shown in
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the previous section, bank capital requirements are beneficial for sharing consumption risk
in credit arrangements. However, in this extended model there are currency transactions
as well. Thus the welfare improvement of bank capital requirements also depends on how
capital requirements influence currency exchanges in the DM. Suppose that when δ increases,
the FOC curve shifts leftward more than the IC curve shifts rightward. Then x1 decreases
and the inflation rate goes up in equilibrium. This implies that the inefficiency in the
currency trade increases by imposing bank capital requirements. Thus, although the credit
arrangements can improve as the consumption risk is shared, the currency trade can be worse
off.
Lemma 1.8. Given δ ≥ 0, when the allcation x1 increases and xl2 decreases by moving
along the IC curve, the welfare improves.
Proof. Given δ if the nominal interest rate decreases then the equilibrium allocation moves
along the IC curve. Thus I consider that given δ and the nominal interest rate, 1
zˆ
− 1,
the allocation is welfare-improving as zˆ increases. If we add up the expected utilities
across agents in a stationary equilibrium, the welfare measure in the extended model is
described as
W = ρ{u(x1)− x1}+ (1− ρ)pi{u(xh2)− xh2}+ (1− ρ)(1− pi){u(xl2)− xl2}+ y¯ (1.68)
that represents the sum of surpluses from trade in the DM. Suppose that there exists a unique
equilibrium in region 3 given the nominal interest rate, 1
zˆ
− 1. In region 3 since the incentive
constraint for state h also binds, from (1.63) and (1.65) we have the modified first-order
condition,
zˆu
′
(x1) = pi{(1− δ)u′((1− δ)(xl2 + α)) + δ}+ (1− pi)u
′
(xl2), (1.69)
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and from (1.64) and (1.65) the modified equilibrium condition,
V +K(xl2) = ρx1u
′
(x1) + (1− ρ)pixh2{u′(xh2) + δ1−δ}+ (1− ρ)(1− pi)xl2u
′
(xl2) (1.70)
where K(xl2) =
βyhpi{(1−δ)u′ ((1−δ)(xl2+α))+δ}+βyl(1−pi)u
′
(xl2)
1−β{pi{(1−δ)u′ ((1−δ)(xl2+α))+δ}+(1−pi)u′ (xl2)}
. In the (x1, x
l
2) plane the slope of
welfare function (1.68) with xh2 = (1− δ)(xl2 + α) at z = zˆ is
∂xl2
∂x1
= − ρ{u
′
(x1)− 1}
(1− ρ)[pi{(1− δ)u′((1− δ)(xl2 + α))− (1− δ)}+ (1− pi)(u′(xl2)− 1)]
= − ρ
(1− ρ)zˆ − (1−zˆ)(1−ρ)
u′ (x1)−1
(1.71)
while the slope of the equilibrium condition (1.70) at z = zˆ is
∂xl2
∂x1
= − ρ(1−γ)u
′
(x1)
(1−ρ)(1−γ)[pi{(1−δ)u′ ((1−δ)(xl2+α))+δ}+(1−pi)u′ (xl2)]+(1−ρ)piγδ−K′ (xl2)
= − ρ
(1−ρ)zˆ+ (1−ρ)piγδ−K
′
(xl2)
u
′
(x1)−1
.
(1.72)
Then the slope of welfare function is steeper than the slope of the equilibrium condition
(1.70) since K
′
(xl2) < 0. Thus given bank capital requirements, the welfare improves when
the allocation x1 increases and x
l
2 decreases along the IC curve
Lemma 1.8 shows that the welfare improves as the allocation x1 increases and x
l
2 decreases
along the IC curve. Thus we can divide the effect of bank capital requirements on the
equilibrium allocation into two different factors. One is the risk-sharing effect by which the
allocation in the point A moves to the allocation in the point B in Figure 1.8. The other is
the illiquidity effect by which the allocation in the point B moves to the allocation in the
point C in Figure 1.8. Thus by the illiquidity effect, a higher quantity of goods is traded
in credit arrangements while a lower quantity of goods is traded in currency transactions.
Note that the risk-sharing effect improves welfare, but the illiquidity effect on the welfare is
ambiguous because the direction of the new equilibrium allocation depends on the degree of
the shifts in both FOC and IC curves.
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Proposition 1.9. If agents are sufficiently risk-averse with γ > γ∗ and the equilibrium
allocation x1 increases by δ in a neighborhood of δ = 0, then the welfare improves by
imposing δ > 0.
Proof Given the risk-aversion of agents γ > γ∗ and the nominal interest rate zˆ, suppose that
the equilibrium allocation (xˆ1, xˆ
l
2) exists in region 3. Define an equilibrium allocation
as (x˜1, x˜
l
2) which is determined with δ = δ˜ > 0. Then the movement from (xˆ1, xˆ
l
2) to
(x˜1, x˜
l
2) is divided into two parts. One is the movement of x
l
2 along the vertical line
at x1 = xˆ1. The other is the movement that x1 increases and x
l
2 decreases along the
changed IC curve. The welfare improves from the first movement by Propostion 1 and
also improves from the second movement by Lemma 4 
The Proposition 1.9 implies that if the sufficient condition for Proposition 1.4, γ > γ∗,
is satisfied and currency transactions increase by the shift of the FOC curve then bank
capital requirements can improve welfare as a sufficient condition. Note that as long as the
benefit of sharing consumption risk is greater than the cost of holding additional capital and
the additional inefficiency in currency exchange, bank capital requirements are beneficial for
society. Thus even though x1 decreases by imposing bank capital requirements, the welfare
can improve if the risk-sharing effect dominates the illiquidity effect.
Notice that this illiquidity effect in which the allocation moves along the IC curve is
similar to the effect of open market operations because the quantities of currency trade and
credit arrangements are adjusted. However, this illiquidity effect is different because it is
generated by affecting prices through capital requirements instead of changing the supply
of liquid and illiquid assets through open market operations. This result implies that bank
capital requirements can also function as a monetary policy tool without exchanging liquid
and illiquid assets.
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Figure 1.9: Welfare Improvement of Bank Capital Requirements in Monetary Equilibrium
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These results are also shown in Figure 1.9 with numerical examples. In the right-side
panel graphs given a zero nominal interest rate where the conventional monetary policy is
restricted, imposing capital requirements can reduce real interest rates on assets further as
discussed. Note that the difference between real returns on government bonds and on private
assets is decreasing in δ since consumption risk is shared in credit arrangements. In this case
the welfare improves as δ increases although x1 decreases. This is because the benefit of
sharing risk in credit arrangements is greater than the cost of holding bank capital and the
inefficiency in currency exchange. With the middle and the left panel graphs, it is also found
that bank capital requirements will be beneficial as the nominal interest rate approaches
to zero. As shown in the upper panel graphs currency exchange, x1 , does not change by
imposing capital requirements in each case. However, the cost of holding additional bank
capital can be different by cases. Since total assets become less scarce when the nominal
interest rate approaches zero by Lemma 1.8, the cost of holding bank capital is decreasing
in z.18 Thus in this numerical example bank capital requirements will be beneficial as the
nominal interest rate approaches zero because the cost of holding bank capital is decreasing
in z.
1.5 Conclusion
I construct a banking model in which a contingent deposit contract is chosen to provide liq-
uidity efficiently given aggregate risk. With limited commitment, deposit claims are backed
by bank assets, so that a liquidity premium on assets can arise when the supply of assets
is insufficient for efficient exchange in at least one state. In this case it is costly to hold
bank capital, but by holding bank capital the banker can manage liquidity for the depositors
in an efficient way. A pro-cyclical bank capital requirement, which forces bankers to hold
18In monetary equilibrium the cost of holding assets does not depend only on the level of the real interest
rate on private assets because bankers also hold currency for their asset portfolio. In this case the cost of
holding currency is lower as the nominal interest rate goes to zero since the level of currency exchange, x1,
is increasing in z.
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additional bank capital in the high-return state, can improve welfare by smoothing consump-
tion. Although it is costly to hold additional bank capital, reducing the pledgeability of the
assets in the high-return state can relax the incentive constraint in the low-return state by
affecting the asset price. In the extended model with money and government bonds, the
relationship between bank capital requirements and monetary policy is studied. Since bank
capital requirements adjust the pledgeability of the assets, bank capital requirements can
influence macroeconomic variables such as the inflation rate and real interest rates on the
assets. If agents are risk-averse enough, bank capital requirements will be beneficial as the
nominal interest rate approaches zero.
This paper takes steps to understand the role of bank capital for efficient liquidity provi-
sion. It also sheds light on the rationale for bank capital requirements as a macro-prudential
policy that accommodates risk-sharing by affecting the pledgeability of assets. This im-
plication is consistent with recent empirical studies in which macro-prudential policy tools
are shown as effective in stabilizing credit-cycles. Lim et al. (2011) find that several macro-
prudential tools, such as the Loan-to-Value ratio cap, dynamic provisioning, and the counter-
cyclical buffer, can reduce the pro-cyclicality of credit growth by using the 2011 IMF survey
data. Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015) develop a new index of macro-prudential policies
in 57 countries and show that macro-prudential policy variables exert a negative effect on
bank credit growth with a dynamic panel data model. However, this result cannot provide
an answer for welfare issues because the cost of externality is given exogenously in the pre-
vious theoretical models. This paper can contribute to this growing literature by providing
a relevant justification for welfare improvement with a theoretical model in which the cost
of holding capital is endogenously chosen.
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Chapter 2
Scarcity of Assets, Private
Information, and the Liquidity Trap
2.1 Introduction
The liquidity trap, in which monetary policy is no longer effective, has been a subject
of interest to both monetary theorists and central bankers since the Great Depression of
the 1930s. In particular, excess reserves are associated with the liquidity trap because ex-
changing reserves with government bonds is ineffective to real allocations. One conventional
explanation for excess reserves is based on lack of good loan opportunities. For example,
in recessions commercial banks would hold excess reserves voluntarily since the expected
return of projects is lower than the rate of return in reserves. The other widespread view
of excess reserves is that banks accumulate reserves to offset the aggregate liquidity shock
such as large withdrawals in banking panics. In this paper I develop a new theory of the
liquidity trap in which excess reserves are useful for providing liquidity insurance efficiently
by revealing private information.
Providing liquidity insurance is one of the primary functions of banks. When people
are exposed to idiosyncratic liquidity risk, separating the types by liquidity needs ex post is
56
beneficial for efficient liquidity distribution. For example, a banking contract can provide
liquid assets to impatient agents with low returns while promising high returns to patient
agents with illiquid assets. If the returns for the patient types are sufficiently high, private
information on the types does not matter because the patient types would prefer to earn
high returns. However, if the rate of return for patient types is sufficiently low then the
patient types have an incentive to mimic impatient types so that separating the types is
difficult under private information. In this case in order to separate the types, banks are
required to hold sufficient assets, either liquid or illiquid, for patient types. In this respect
excess reserves can exist in the balance sheet of banks to distribute liquidity efficiently by
types. In this case if the real value of total assets is fixed, adjusting the proportion of liquid
and illiquid assets is no longer effective in real allocations.
In order to explore this issue I construct an asset-exchange model in which two differ-
ent liquid assets can be used for separating the types. This micro-founded model is useful
for incorporating informational frictions such as lack of memory and limited commitment,
and it is also highly tractable with a banking contract. The basic structure of the model
builds on Lagos and Wright (2005), specifically Rocheteau and Wright (2005), where ex
ante heterogeneous agents trade in decentralized meetings and rebalance their portfolios in
a centralized market. The form of banking contract comes from Williamson (2012) where
a banking contract provides liquid assets for asset exchange and illiquid assets for credit
arrangements. There are fixed supplys of both private and government assets that are insuf-
ficient to support the optimal level of consumption in both exchanges. Given the supply of
assets, a banking contract is considered to maximize the ex ante expected value of depositors
under perfect competition.
One important assumption is lack of record-keeping technology. This anonymity assump-
tion makes recognizable assets essential for decentralized trade. Simultaneously, when agents
are subject to individual liquidity risk, this imperfect memory inhibits banks in revealing
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the types.1 Thus a banking contract with truth-telling constraints is considered to provide
liquidity insurance efficiently under private information.
This paper provides two key findings. First, when the total supply of assets is insufficient
to separate the types, a liquidity premium could arise in the price of illiquid assets even
though illiquid assets are not useful for trade directly. It is because illiquid assets are useful
for revealing the private type information. After the individual liquidity risk is realized, the
optimal liquidity distribution of banks is to provide liquid assets to the impatient types.
However, the patient types always have an incentive to mimic the impatient types. Thus
banks are required to hold liquid or illiquid assets to inhibit the impatient types from with-
drawing liquid assets. Thus when the supply of assets is insufficient to separate the types,
the liquidity premium can arise in either liquid or illiquid asset prices.
Secondly, when the total supply of assets is insufficient to separate the types, a proportion
of liquid assets, i.e. excess reserves, should be held in balance sheets of banks for the patient
types to reveal their types. In this case although the government injects money in the markets
by absorbing government bonds, the currency trade does not increase since the injected
money would be just held as reserves to reveal the types. This liquidity trap equilibrium can
exist when the truth-telling constraint binds to reveal the private information. Thus it could
exist away from the zero-lower-bound in which the conventional liquidity trap equilibrium
exists: a liquidity trap can exist when the rates of return in currency and government bonds
are the same at the zero nominal interest rate.
The first finding is related to the literature about the liquidity premium on asset prices.
Geromichalos et. al. (2007) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) show that the asset prices can
have a liquidity premium when the assets are useful for exchange. This paper is different
from these papers because illiquid assets are not useful for trade although there exists a
liquidity premium on those assets when the supply of assets is insufficient. This usefulness
of illiquid assets is also different from the reasons why the illiquid bonds are beneficial in
1If record-keeping is available, credit or (proportional) tax scheme can replicate the optimal equilibrium
allocation even under private information.
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Kocherlakota (2003) and Shi (2008). Kocherlakota (2003) shows that illiquid bonds can relax
the cash-in-advance constraint as agents can trade assets after observing idiosyncratic shock.
Shi (2008) shows that the welfare improves when government bonds are legally restricted for
one type of trade. In those papers illiquid assets are useful because they are less liquid than
liquid assets, but in this paper both liquid and illiquid assets can be useful to separate the
types.
The second result is related to the literature on the implementation of monetary policy.
Wallace (1981) studies the effectiveness of monetary policy, in particular open market oper-
ations, by applying the Modigliani-Miller theorem to the government liability structure. In
this paper excess reserves can exist in equilibrium when the truth-telling constraint binds
so that monetary policy can be ineffective. These excess reserves are different from the ones
in the liquidity trap as shown in Williamson (2012) because excess reserves are uniquely
determined to reveal the types in this paper.
This paper is related to the literature on liquidity insurance. In their pioneering paper
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that bank runs can exist as an equilibrium outcome
when liquidity shocks are private information. Allen and Gale (1998) point out that the
rates of return on long-term projects are critical to revealing the type information in the
Diamond-Dybvig type model. In this paper private information is emphasized as a main
friction. Moreover, there is no coordination failure of patient agents as shown in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and no default by aggregate risk as in Allen and Gale (1998).
This paper builds on the previous banking models with an explicit asset trade. Freeman
(1988) and Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) study banking and liquidity insurance
with overlapping generation models. Recently, Bencivenga and Camera (2011) have used
uncertainty in trading opportunity in the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework to introduce
an insurance banking, but a standard debt contract is considered without individual incentive
constraints as shown in their paper. Williamson (2012) constructs a Diamond-Dybvig type
bank in the Rocheteau and Wright (2005) framework and shows that a liquidity trap can
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exist away from the Friedman rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3 offers a simple model with two different liquidity assets and compares the equilibrium
allocations under perfect information and private information. Section 4 extends the model
with government liabilites and monetary policy and analyzes in what circumstance monetary
policy can be ineffective. Section 5 discusses the result to address implications, and Section
6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The basic structure of the model is based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Time t =
0, 1, 2, . . . is discrete in infinite horizon and each period is divided into two sub-periods - the
Centralized Meeting (CM) followed by the Decentralized Meeting (DM). The population
consists of two types of ex ante heterogeneous agents, buyers and sellers, who are infinitely
lived with [0, 1] continuum of each type. An individual buyer has preferences
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[−Ht + θitu(xt)]
where Ht ∈ R is labor supply in the CM, xt ∈ R+ is consumption in the DM, and 0 < β < 1.
Assume that u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable
with u
′
(0) =∞, u(0) = 0, and −xu
′′
(x)
u′ (x) < 1 for all x > 0.
2 One variation is that each buyer
is exposed to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, θit, which follows independent and identical
distribution with two realizations {1, θ} where θ ∈ [0, 1) by types i = 1, 2. With probability
ρ ∈ (0, 1) a buyer can be type 1 with θ1t = 1 and otherwise a buyer is type 2 with θ2t = θ.
There can be ex post heterogeneity in marginal utility across the buyers.3 Each seller has
2In the model asset demand is strictly increasing in rates of return when the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is less than one. It quarantees to have at least one equilibrium exists.
3This is different with Shi (2008) where illiquid bonds are beneficial because it can be used for higher
marginal utility trade. It is also different with He, Huang and Wright (2008) where theft on money trade
can lead higher marginal utility in deposit claims trade.
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preferences as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt − ht]
where Xt ∈ R is consumption in the CM, and ht ∈ R+ is labor supply in the DM. Buyers can
produce in the CM, but cannot produce in the DM while sellers can produce in the DM, but
cannot produce in the CM. One unit of labor inputs can produce one unit of consumption
goods in the CM and DM. It is assumed that the consumption goods are perfectly divisible
and perishable.
There are two types of nominal government-issued assets. Fiat money trades at price φt
in terms of goods in the competitive market of period t CM. One-period maturity government
bonds is an obligation to pay one unit of fiat money in the period t + 1 CM. The price of
government bonds is zt in terms of goods in the period t CM. There are also two types of
real private assets - two divisible Lucas trees. Each tree is endowed to buyers in the initial
period CM with a fixed unit supply. One tree, named as liquid tree, pays dividend yl and
trades at the price ψlt in terms of goods in period t CM whereas the other tree, called as
illiquid tree pays dividend yi and trades at the price ψit in terms of goods in period t CM.
4
In the beginning of the CM, buyers and sellers meet together and debts are settled.
Buyers receive lump-sum transfer or pay lump-sum tax and the the holders of the Lucas
trees receive the realized dividends. A Walrasian market opens, assets and goods are traded
competitively. In the DM each buyer meets each seller bilaterally and the terms of trade
are determined by bargaining. The buyer make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller in the
meetings. I assume that all agents are anonymous and there is no public record-keeping
technology in the CM and DM. Thus recognizable assets are essential for trade and all trade
must be quid pro quo. Similar to Sanches and Williamson (2010), there are two types of
meetings by the types of buyers in the DM. In a fraction ρ of DM meetings with type 1
4This Lucas tree represents private investment as described in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), but since the
supply is fixed the inefficiency is reflected to its price instead of quantity as shown in Lagos and Rocheteau
(2008).
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buyers, fiat money and the liquid tree are the only assets recognized by sellers. In 1 − ρ
fraction of DM meetings with type 2 buyers, the sellers can verify the entire portfolio held
by buyers.5 Limited commitment is assumed so that agents can run away in the next CM,
but the assets are seized and settled as a collateral. In sum type 1 buyers can trade only
with fiat money or liquid tree and have a utility with θ1t = 1 in the DM whereas type 2
buyers can trade through credit arrangement with all their asset portfolio and have a utility
with θ2t = θ.
Given idiosyncratic liquidity shock a banking arrangement arises endogenously to allocate
liquid and illiquid assets by the type of buyers efficiently. Without a banking contract type
2 buyers could hold idle liquid assets while type 1 buyers could hold idle illiquid assets.
All agents can propose a banking contract which provides liquidity insurance in a way of
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). It is socially optimal that banks provide liquid assets including
fiat money to type 1 buyers who move to ρ proportion of meetings and provide illiquid assets
including government bonds to type 2 buyers who move to 1 − ρ proportion of meetings.
Banks observe the size of shock ρ exactly, but banks cannot verify the type of buyers after
realization. Thus one type of buyers can mimic the other type of buyers under private
information.6 In this environment if the real value of liquid assets to type 1 buyers is greater
than the value of illiquid assets to type 2 buyers then type 2 buyers will mimic type 1 buyers
since liquid assets are also useful for trade in 1 − ρ proportion of meetings. To support
banking arrangement I assume that buyers can meet only a bank in the CM after their
liquidity shock is realized. If ex post asset-trading among buyers is allowed then banking
contract is unraveled and collapsed as shown in Jacklin (1987).7
5It is not contrary to no record-keeping technology assumption. Suppose sellers accept a deposit claim
issued by banks and backed by asset portfolio of buyers, and redeem it in the next CM.
6In order to avoid bank runs created by sequential service I assume that buyers send a notification about
their types to the bank simultaneously.
7Note that a banking contract equilibrium provides higher welfare than assets-trading market equilibrium.
It is because a bank contract can provide resources to high marginal utility agents as much as it can regardless
of prices.
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Figure 2.1: Time line
Timing is as follows as shown in Figure 2.1. In the beginning of CM deposit claims are
paid and government-bonds holders can receive a unit of fiat money by redeeming a unit
of government bonds. Then buyers receive lump-sum transfer(or pay lump-sum tax). All
buyers provide labor and trade assets with sellers in a Walrasian market. Buyers deposit
goods or assets into a banker with a banking contract. After liquidity shock is realized,
buyers learn their types and ρ buyers meet the banker to withdraw currency and liquid
assets. In the DM buyers meet sellers randomly in the bilateral meeting and make take-it-
or-leave-it offers. In the next CM 1 − ρ sellers can redeem deposit claims to the banker or
sell them to buyers.
2.2.1 Government
In the model government consists of fiscal authority and monetary authority. Fiscal authority
can enforce lump-sum tax or provide transfer to buyers in the CM and issue government
bonds and pay interests in the next CM. Monetary authority can issue fiat money and inject
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or absorb fiat money by exchanging money with government bonds in the asset market,
i.e. open-market-operations. I assume that private assets are not eligible to be an object
for OMOs. Thus after government bonds are issued and fiat money is injected by open-
market-operations at t = 0 and the revenue of issueing government bonds and fiat money is
transferred to buyers. Then outstanding fiat money and government bonds can be supported
by tax or transfer over time. So the consolidated government budget constraints are described
as
φ0(M0 + z0B0) = τ0 = V
and
φt{Mt −Mt−1 + ztBt −Bt−1} = τt, t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
where Mt and Bt denote the nominal quantities of fiat money and government bonds held
by private sector in the CM at time t, respectively. τt denote the real value of the lump-sum
transfer from each buyer to the fiscal authority in the CM at period t. I assume that the
fiscal authority keeps the total value of the outstanding consolidated government debt as a
constant V after it is transferred with an exogenously fixed amount at t = 0. Thus in every
period to maintain the real value of outstanding consolidated government debt, the real term
of lump-sum transfer τt is derived passively from
τt = (Vt − φt
φt−1
Vt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
φt
φt−1
(1− zt−1)φt−1Bt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸ , t = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
seigniorage real interest payment
Note that the lump-sum transfer consists of seigniorage from inflation and real interest pay-
ment for government bonds. The fixed real value of consolidated government debt assump-
tion allows us to separate monetary policy, specifically OMOs, from fiscal policy. Moreover,
when V is assumed as small enough, assets can be insufficient to support the optimal level
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of consumption.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium with Liquid and Illiquid
Assets
In this section to emphasize private information friction I assume that illiquid assets are
not useful for trade at all with θ = 0. Also, in order to make a clear point I exclude the
government liabilities by assuming V = 0. So we have only two different Lucas trees in
the model. One is useful for trade with price ψlt and dividend y
l while the other cannot
be used in transactions at all with price ψit and dividend y
i. In the following subsections
I consider each perfect information and private information case and compare the equilib-
rium allocations to understand the reason why the liquidity insurance can be restricted by
the private information. Under private information banks suggest two type-dependent con-
sumption offers {(xl1, xi1), (xl2, xi2)} for type 1 and type 2 buyers to reveal their types. Note
that superscripts denote type of assets between liquid and illiquid while subscripts denote
type j of buyers: xljt, x
i
jt represents the consumption level of type j buyers with liquid and
illiquid assets. Under perfect competition a representative bank suggests a banking contract
to maximize buyers’ ex ante expected value. In equilibrium the bank solves the following
generalized problem in the CM of period t:
Max
dt,alt,a
i
t,x
l
1t,x
i
1t,x
l
2t,x
i
2t
− dt + ρ{u(xl1t) + xi1t}+ (1− ρ){xl2t + xi2t} (2.1)
subject to a participation constraint of the bank,
dt−ψltalt−ψitait+{β(ψlt+1 +yl)alt−ρxl1t− (1−ρ)xl2t}+{β(ψit+1 +yi)ait−ρxi1t− (1−ρ)xi2t} ≥ 0
(2.2)
and incentive constraints of the bank,
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β(ψlt+1 + y
l)alt − ρxl1t ≥ 0 (2.3)
β(ψlt+1 + y
l)alt + β(ψ
i
t+1 + y
i)ait − ρxi1t − (1− ρ){xl2t + xi2t} ≥ 0 (2.4)
and truth-telling constraints,
u(xl1t) + x
i
1t ≥ u(xl2t) + xi2t (2.5)
xl2t + x
i
2t ≥ xl1t + xi1t (2.6)
and non-negative constraints,
dt, a
l
t, a
i
t, x
l
1t, x
i
1t, x
l
2t, x
i
2t ≥ 0 (2.7)
All quantities in equations (2.1)-(2.7) are expressed in units of the CM good in time t.
The problem (2.1) subject to constraints (2.2)-(2.7) states that a banking contract is chosen
in equilibrium to maximize the expected utility of the representative buyer subject to the
participation constraint for the banks (2.2) and liquid asset constaint (2.3) and collateral
constraint (2.4) and individual incentive constraints by types (2.5)-(2.6) and non-negativity
constraints (2.7). In (2.1)-(2.7) dt denotes deposit of buyers, a
l
t, a
i
t denote demand for liquid
and illiquid asset holdings of banks, ψlt, ψ
i
t denote the prices of liquid and illiquid assets in
the CM, respectively. The quantity on the left side of (2.2) is the net payoff for banks. In
the CM of time t the banks receive dt deposits and invest in liquid and illiquid assets with
market prices then the banks pay xljt to each type buyer before the DM and pay x
i
jt to
the holders of deposit claims in the following CM. The participation constraint (2.2) implies
that when deposit claims are paid off, the net payoff for the banks must be greater than
zero. The liquid asset constraint (2.3) implies that type 1 buyers can withdraw liquid assets
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by the limit of liquid asset holdings. The collateral constraint (2.4) implies that the liquid
and illiquid assets can be seized when the bank desides to abscond. Individual incentive
constraint (2.5)-(2.6) represent that each type of buyer weakly prefer an offer for own type
to the offer for other type after type shock is realized. Note that type 1 buyers can also
consume with illiquid assets in the next CM.
2.3.1 Perfect Information
For a benchmark I consider competitive equilibrium with perfect information. In case of
perfect information banks know the buyer’s type exactly after the liquidity shock is realized.
In equilibrium ex post banks will provide all of liquid assets to type 1 buyers who only can
trade in the DM. Since illiquid assets are useless for trade banks will not hold these assets
as long as the real return of the illiquid asset are less than time preference. If the real return
of the illiquid asset is same as time preference then banks can hold these illiquid assets and
provide them to type 1 or 2 buyers, but it is irrelevant since both type buyers have linear
utility function for illiquid assets. Thus without loss of generality I assume that banks do
not hole illiquid assets, i.e. xi1t = x
i
2t = 0, with perfect information. Moreover, truth-telling
constraints are unnecessary. Thus given price ψlt, a representative bank solves the reduced
maximization problem in the CM of period t:
Max
dt,alt,x
l
1t
− dt + ρu(xl1t) (2.8)
subject to the participation constraint,
dt − ψltalt + {β(ψlt+1 + yl)alt − ρxl1t} ≥ 0 (2.9)
and liquid asset constraint,
β(ψlt+1 + y
l)alt − ρxl1t ≥ 0 (2.10)
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and non-negative constraints,
dt, a
l
t, x
l
1t ≥ 0 (2.11)
By plugging (9) into (8) we have the first-order conditions by alt, x
l
1t,
ψlt = β(ψ
l
t+1 + y
l)(1 + λt) (2.12)
u
′
(xl1t)− 1 = λt (2.13)
where λt is a multiplier associated with liquid asset constraint (10). The first-order conditions
(12) and (13) can be reduced to
ψlt = β(ψ
l
t+1 + y
l)u
′
(xl1t) (2.14)
In equilibrium asset market clear in the CM and a representative bank holds all the liquid
asset in its portfolio for t = 0, 1, 2, . . ... The supply of liquid asset is equal to the demand of
banks as
alt = 1. (2.15)
Definition 2.1 : Given (ρ, yl, yi) a stationary competitive equilibrium under perfect infor-
mation consists of quantity xl1t and price ψ
l
t and multiplier λ which solves equations
(2.10), (2.14), (2.15).
In what follows I focus on stationary equilibrium allocations without time scripts on variables.
There are two equilibrium cases following by the value of y.
Case (i) Suppose that the liquid asset constraint (2.10) does not bind. That means, in
equilibrium the first-best consumption level, x∗ where u
′
(x∗) = 1, is achieved for type 1
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Figure 2.2: Perfect Information
buyers. From the first-order condition (2.14), the asset price is the same as its fundamental
value:ψl = ψlf holds where ψ
l
f ≡ βy
l
1−β . Note that this case of equilibrium is supported by
yl ≥ (1−β)
β
ρx∗ from (2.10).
Case (ii) Suppose that the liquid asset constraint (2.10) binds with yl < (1−β)
β
ρx∗. Then
the equilibrium allocation (xl1, ψ
l) is uniquely determined from (2.10) and (2.14) since ψl is
strictly increasing in xl1 from (2.10) while ψ
l is strictly decreasing in xl1 from (2.14). Note that
the consumption level is less than its optimal level, xl1 < x
∗ and the asset price is greater than
its fundamental value,ψl > ψlf in equilibrium. Liquidity premium, the difference between
the asset price and its fundamental value is strictly positive because of liquid asset shortage.
The price of illiquid asset is same as its fundamental value as ψi = ψif where ψ
i
f ≡ βy
i
1−β , if it
is traded in the market.
These two cases can be described in Figure 2.2. If the supply of liquid asset is large enough
with yl ≥ (1−β)
β
ρx∗ then we have the case 1 equilibrium with the first-best allocation. If the
supply of liquid asset is low with yl < (1−β)
β
ρx∗ then we would have this case 2 equilibrium.
2.3.2 Private Information
In case of private information as described above, banks solve the original maximization
problem (2.1)-(2.7). To simplify the problem I use some lemmas here.
Lemma 2.2. (Single Crossing Property) In equilibrium with xl1t ∈ [0, x∗), both truth-telling
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constraints do not bind simultaneously.
proof If both truth-telling constraints (2.5) and (2.6) bind then u(xl1t)− xl1t = u(xl2t)− xl2t.
Since u(x) − x is strictly increasing in x ∈ [0, x∗], xl1t = xl2t and xi1t = xi2t. Note that
xi1t = x
i
2t > 0 for y > 0 in equilibrium. For x
l
1t = x
l
2t < x
∗the expected value of buyers
can increase by transferring liquid assets from type 2 buyers to type 1 buyers and
transferring the same amount of illiquid assets from type 1 buyers to type 2 buyers.
Contradiction.
Lemma 2.3. In equilibrium with xl1t ∈ [0, x∗), the truth-telling constraint for type 1 buyers
does not bind.
proof Suppose that the constraint (2.5) binds while the constraint (2.6) does not bind. If
xl2t > 0 then the expected value of buyers can increase by transferring liquid assets
from type 2 buyers to type 1 buyers. If xl2t = 0 then the expected value of buyers are
indifferent when illiquid assets are transferred from type 2 buyers to type 1 buyers that
means (2.6) does not bind. Contradiction 
In equilibrium the truth-telling constraint for type 1 buyers (2.5) does not bind. It is because
banks allocate resources to type 1 buyers who have higher marginal utility as much as possible
to maximize the expected utility for agents. Thus the incentive constraint for type 2 buyers
always binds. In Figure 2.3, indifference curve of type 1 buyers intersects the indifference
curve of type 2 buyers at xl1t. To keep utility for type 2 buyers x
i
2t is required. Since (2.5)
does not bind, there is no difference between xi2t and x
l
2t in the problem so that they can be
merged as x2t. Note that type-dependent contract is non-linear in general, but in this case
deposit contract is linear as standard deposit contract because quasi-linear utility is adopted.
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Figure 2.3: Single Crossing Property
Lemma 2.3. In equilibrium with xl1t ∈ [0, x∗),xi1t = 0.
proof Suppose that xi1t > 0 in equilibrium. If the truth-telling constraint for type 2 buyers
(2.6) binds then transferring illiquid assets to type 2 buyers can relax (2.6). If (2.6)
does not bind then the expected value of buyers is indifferent. Thus there is no reason
to have xi1t > 0 in equilibrium
Illiquid assets for type 1 buyers are unnecessary because neither it is used for trade nor it
overcomes private information friction in (2.12). Since xi1t = 0 in equilibrium we can rename
xl1t as x1t. Without the truth-telling constraint for type 1 buyers (2.5) and with choice
variable x1tand x2t, we have the first-order conditions by a
l
t, a
i
t, x1t, x2t,
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ψlt = β(ψ
l
t+1 + y
l)(1 + λ1t + λ2t) (2.16)
ψit = β(ψ
i
t+1 + y
i)(1 + λ2t) (2.17)
ρu
′
(x1t)− ρ− ρλ1t − λ3t = 0 (2.18)
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)− (1− ρ)λ2t + λ3t = 0 (2.19)
where λ1t,λ2t and λ3t denote each multiplier associated with the constraints (2.3), (2.4) and
(2.6). In equilibrium asset markets clear in the CM and a representative bank holds all the
liquid and illiquid assets in its portfolio for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The supply of liquid and illiquid
asset is equal to its demand from banks, respectively, as shown in (2.20).
alt = a
i
t = 1 (2.20)
Definition 2.4. Given (ρ, yl, yi) a stationary competitive equilibrium under private infor-
mation consists of quantity x1,x2 and price ψ
l
t,ψ
i
t and multiplier λ1t,λ2t,λ3t which solves
equations (2.3)-(2.4),(2.6),(2.16)-(2.20).
I focus on stationary equilibrium allocations without time scripts on variables. Note that
the collateral constraint (2.4) and the truth-telling constraint (2.6) either binds or does not
bind together from (2.19) because x2 > 0 in equilibrium with y
i > 0. If the truth-telling
constraint (2.6) binds with λ3 > 0 then the liquid asset constraint (2.3) is relaxed with
λ1 = 0 because only one of them can restrict x1 ∈ [0, x∗) in equilibrium. In sum under
private information there are three equilibrium cases. As discussed in perfect information
subsection we have case (i) and (ii) equilibrium and additionally a new equilibrium, case (iii)
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equilibrium, in which the truth-telling constraint (2.6) binds and the liquid asset constraint
(2.3) is relaxed.
Case (i) When the constraints (2.3), (2.4), (2.6) do not bind we have
ψl
β(ψl + yl)
=
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
= 1 (2.21)
and
1 = u
′
(x1) (2.22)
from the first-order conditions (2.16)-(2.18). Since the constraints do not bind, the optimal
level of consumption is achieved, x1 = x
∗, for type 1 buyers and the asset prices are the
same as their fundamental values, ψl = ψlf , ψ
i = ψif from (2.21)-(2.22). The equilibrium
is supported by a region with ψlf ≥ ρx∗ and ψlf + ψif ≥ x∗ from (2.3)-(2.4), (2.20). Note
that this first-best equilibrium allocaion is the same as one in perfect information case (i).
One interesting point is that this first-best equilibrium allocaion is feasible even when there
exists a degree of private information as long as liquid and illiquid assets are plentiful in the
economy.
Case (ii) When the liquid asset constraint (2.3) binds only, we have
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
= 1 (2.23)
and
ψl
β(ψl + yl)
= u
′
(x1) (2.24)
from (2.16)-(2.18). The binding constraint (2.3) with asset market clear condition (2.20) can
be reduced into
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β(ψl + yl) = ρx1 (2.25)
Then (x1, ψ
l) are uniquely determined from (2.24) and (2.25). In equilibrium we have x1 <
x∗,ψl > ψlf , ψ
i = ψif and x1 ≤ x2. Note that a liquidity premium arises in the price of
the liquid asset since the inefficiency is caused by the scarcity of liquid asset as described in
Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996). On the other hand, the price of illiquid asset keeps at
its fundamental value because those illiquid assets are already plentiful. The equilibrium is
supported by a region which satisfies with ψlf < ρx
∗ and yl ≥ ρ
1−ρy
i. If yi is too low then there
exists a threshold point in which the truth-telling constraint (2.6) starts to bind while the
liquid asset constraint (2.3) is just relaxed. In this threshold point we have β(ψl +yl) = ρx1,
β(ψi + yi) = (1− ρ)x2, x2 = x1 from (2.3), (2.4), (2.6). We also have ψiβ(ψi+yi) = ψ
l
β(ψl+yl)
from
(2.16)-(2.17) since the liquid asset constraint (2.3) is just slack at the point. Note that those
conditions can be reduced into yl = ρ
1−ρy
i which is a threshold borderline between case (ii)
and case (iii) equilibrium. Note that this case (ii) equilibrium is also the same as the case 2
equilibrium under perfect information.
Case (iii) When the collateral constraint (2.4) and the truth-telling constraint (2.6) bind,
we have
ψl
β(ψl + yl)
=
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
=
{ρu′(x) + 1− ρ} − ρ
1− ρ (2.26)
and
β(ψl + yl) + β(ψi + yi) = x (2.27)
from (2.16)-(2.20) where x ≡ x1 = x2 is denoted. Then (x, ψl, ψi) are uniquely determined
from the equilibrium condition (2.26)-(2.27). In equilibrium we have x < x∗,ψl > ψlf ,
ψi > ψif . Note that a liquidity premium arises in the both prices of liquid and illiquid assets
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Figure 2.4: Private Information
although the liquid asset constraint does not bind in equilibrium. It is because both liquid
and illiquid assets are scarce to reveal the private information in equilibrium. In equilibrium
a proportion of liquid assets must be provided to type 2 buyers so that rates of return in
liquid asset and illiquid asset are same in equilibrium. Note that a liquidity premium arises
although illiquid assets are not useful for trade at all.
Three regions of equilibrium under private information are described in Figure 2.4. Notice
that the first-best equilibrium allocation appears when liquid assets are plentiful and are
supported by sufficient illiquid assets. The case (ii) equilibrium allocation is shown when
liquid assets are scarce although those liquid assets are supported by illiquid assets enough.
The case (iii) equilibrium allocation arises when the types are hardly revealed because of the
scarcity of illiquid assets.
2.4 Monetary Equilibrium
In this section I verify how this private information restricts the implementation of monetary
policy, specifically open-market-operations. We have money and government bonds in the
model with V > 0, but do not have private liquid assets with yl = 0. Note that private
liquid assets are irrelevant because we focus on the case in which illiquid assets are scarce.
Also type 2 buyers can consume through credit arrangement. However, the marginal utility
in credit arrangement is less than the marginal utility in currency trade with θ ∈ (0, 1).
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This assumption represents that credit arrangement trade is less preferable than currency
trade in a view of social welfare. One rationaliazation of this assumption is a social cost of
operating payment and settlement for credit arrangement. Note that this assumption will
provide an incentive for banks to increase currency exchange more than credit arrangement
for social optimality. Thus this assumption lets the truth-telling constraint bind when the
bank maximizes the ex ante expected value of buyers. Note that the model can be reduced
to the baseline model of Williamson (2014) if type information is perfect and θ = 1. A
representative bank solves the following modified problem in the CM of period t:
Max
dt,mt,bt,at,x1t,x2t
− dt + ρu(x1t) + (1− ρ)θu(x2t) (2.28)
subject to the participation constraint,
dt−mt−ztbt−ψitait+{
βφt+1
φt
mt−ρx1t}+{βφt+1
φt
bt+β(ψ
i
t+1 +y
i)ait− (1−ρ)x2t} ≥ 0 (2.29)
and the cash constraint,
βφt+1
φt
mt − ρx1t ≥ 0 (2.30)
and the collateral constraint,
βφt+1
φt
(mt + bt) + β(ψ
i
t+1 + y
i)ait − ρx1t − (1− ρ)x2t ≥ 0 (2.31)
and the truth-telling constraint,
x2t ≥ x1t (2.32)
and non-negative constraints,
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dt,mt, bt, a
i
t, x1t, x2t ≥ 0 (2.33)
The problem (2.28) subject to the constraints (2.29)-(2.33) states that a banking contract
is chosen in equilibrium to maximize expected utility of the buyers subject to participation
constraint (2.29) in which banks receive a non-negative profit by providing the contract and
cash constraint for type 1 buyers (2.30) and collateral constraint for type 2 buyers (2.31)
and the incentive constraint for type 2 buyers (2.32) and non-negative constraints (2.33). I
omitted the incentive constraint for type 1 buyers because it does not bind in equilibrium
as shown in Lemma 2.2 and 2.3.8 In (2.28)-(2.33),dt denotes deposit of buyers, at denote
demand for illiquid asset holdings of banks, ψt denote the prices of illiquid assets in the CM,
mt and bt denote the quantities of money and government bonds in terms of the CM good
in period t held by banks and xjt denote the consumption of type j agents at time t CM
for j ∈ {1, 2}. From now on I focus on stationary equilibrium where φt+1
φt
= 1
µ
holds for all
t, and µ is the gross inflation rate. Note that nominal interest rate of government bonds
cannot be negative, i.e. zt ≤ 1, in equilibrium by its feasibility assumption. I assume that
monetary authority sets the inflation rate target and implement OMOs to achieve its goal.
From the maximization problem the first-order conditions by mt, bt, at, x1t, x2t can be
described as follows.
µ
β
= 1 + λ1 + λ2 (2.34)
z
µ
β
=
ψ
β(ψ + y)
= 1 + λ2 (2.35)
u
′
(x1)− λ3
ρ
= 1 + λ1 + λ2 (2.36)
8Both individual incentive constraints do not change although type 2 buyers can trade since liquid and
illiquid assets are used as same for collateral.
77
θu
′
(x2) +
λ3
1− ρ = 1 + λ2 (2.37)
where λ1to λ3 denote each multiplier associated with the constraints (2.30)-(2.32). In equi-
librium asset markets clear in the CM with
ai = 1 (2.38)
m = φM (2.39)
b = φB (2.40)
Since the supply of government assets are restricted by the consolidated government debt
limit V we have
m+ zb ≤ V (2.41)
Definition 2.5. Given (ρ, V, y) and the inflation rate target µ, a stationary monetary equi-
librium consists of quantities (x1, x2) and prices (z, ψ) and multipliers (λ1, λ2, λ3) which
solve equations (2.30)-(2.32),(2.34)-(2.37), (2.41).
Since quasi-linear utility is adopted the real return of assets such as fiat money, µ = φt−1
φt
, and
government bonds, 1
zµ
, illiquid Lucas tree, ψ
i+yi
ψi
, cannot exceed the rate of time preference,
1
β
. The rate of returns in government bonds and Lucas tree are same in equilibrium because
there is no credit risk in Lucas tree. Nominal interest rate of government bonds cannot be
negative, i.e. z ≤ 1, by its feasibility assumption. Then we have no arbitrage condition in
equilibrium,
1
µ
≤ r ≡ 1
zµ
=
ψi + yi
ψi
≤ 1
β
. (2.42)
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Note that if the truth-telling constraint (2.32) binds then cash constraint (2.30) is relaxed
because only one of them can restrict x1 ∈ [0, x∗) in equilibrium. Moreover, when the truth-
telling constraint (2.32) binds collateral constraint (2.31) is required to bind, otherwise the
truth-telling constraint (2.32) does not bind with x2 = x
∗
2. Hence when the truth-telling
constraint (2.32) binds we have only one case of equilibrium with λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0, λ3 > 0. On
the other hand, if the truth-telling constraint (2.32) does not bind then we have four cases
of equilibrium with combination of λ1 and λ2. However, the case constraint (2.30) cannot
be relaxed alone because the liquid assets can be also useful for credit arrangment. Thus we
have totally four equilibrium cases.
(1) Friedman rule Equilibrium When all of the constraints (2.30)-(2.32) do not bind
with λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0, we have
µ
β
= z
µ
β
=
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
= 1 (2.43)
1 = u
′
(x1) = θu
′
(x2) (2.44)
from the first-order conditions (2.34)-(2.37). Note that x1 = x
∗
1,x2 = x
∗
2 and ψ
i = ψif where
u
′
(x∗1) = 1, θu
′
(x∗2) = 1, ψ
i
f =
βyi
1−β in equilibrium. Moreover, the rates of return in both
liquid and illiquid assets are the same as the inverse of time preference, 1
µ
= r = 1
β
where
r ≡ 1
zµ
= ψ
i+yi
ψi
from (2.43)-(2.44) in equilibrium. Thus in this case the Friedman rule,
µ = β, is feasible so that the first-best allocation is achieved. The equilibrium is supported
by a region with V ≥ ρx∗1 and V + ψif ≥ ρx∗1 + (1 − ρ)x∗2 from the equations (2.30)-(2.31),
(2.38), (2.41). Note that this case is the same as the case (i) in competitive equilibrium in
the previous section.
(2) Currency-shortage Equilibrium Suppose that the Friedman rule equilibrium is
infeasible with V < ρx∗1, whileψ
i
f ≥ (1 − ρ)x∗2 is valid. With λ1 > 0, λ2 = λ3 = 0 we have
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the first-order conditions,
µ
β
= u
′
(x1) (2.45)
z
µ
β
=
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
= 1 = θu
′
(x2) (2.46)
in which x2 = x
∗
2 and ψ
i = ψif . Binding cash constraint (2.30) is transformed into ρx1u
′
(x1) =
V . Thus x1 < x
∗
1 is fixed in equilibrium. Then in a region of x1 ∈ (0, x∗1) we have x1 < x∗2and
1
µ
< r = 1
β
in equilibrium. Define this case as Currency-shortage Equilibrium. In this case
real interest rate of illiquid asset is fixed and a liquidity premium arises in the price of money
since only money is scarce. Open market operations are ineffective in real allocations since
real interest rate of illiquid assets and x1 are fixed in equilibrium. Note that this case is the
same as the case (ii) in competitive equilibrium in the previous section.
(3) Asset-shortage Equilibrium Suppose that the Friedman rule equilibrium is infea-
sible with V + ψif < ρx
∗
1 + (1 − ρ)x∗2, but V ≥ ρx∗1 is still valid. Moreover, assume that
λ3 = 0. Then we have the first-order conditions,
µ
β
= u
′
(x1) (2.47)
z
µ
β
=
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
= θu
′
(x2) (2.48)
from (2.34)-(2.37). Binding constraints (2.30) and (2.31) with asset market clearing condition
(2.38) and government budget constraint (2.41) can be reduced into
ρx1u
′
(x1) + (1− ρ)θx2u′(x2) = V + βy
iθu
′
(x2)
1− βθu′(x2) (2.49)
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Given the price of government bonds z, x1 and x2 are positively related in (2.47) and (2.48)
while x1 and x2 is negatively related in (2.49). Thus there exists a unique equilibrium
allocation (x1, x2) as shown in Figure 2.5. Let me briefly describe threshold points as shown
in Figure 2.5. There is a threshold point xˆ1 at x2 = x
∗
2 in which the collateral constraint
starts to bind. There is another point x˜1 in which x1 = x2 holds with the nominal interest
rate z = θ. Finally, there is a point x¯1 where the equilibrium allocation is determined
with the zero nominal interest rate, z = 1. Through open market operations, the monetary
authority can inject money and absorb government bonds in the market. By conducting this
procedure the currency trade x1 increases whereas the credit arrangement x2 decreases. Thus
the monetary authority can choose an equilibrium allocation in x1 ∈ (xˆ1, x¯1] by choosing the
price of government bonds z in equilibrium. However, in this private information case the
truth-telling constraint matters when x1 becomes greater than x2. Thus this asset-shortage
equilibrium can exist only in x1 ∈ (xˆ1, x˜1] with z ≤ θ.
(4) Liquidity-trap Equilibrium Given the Friedman rule equilibrium is infeasible with
V +ψif < ρx
∗
1 + (1−ρ)x∗2 and V ≥ ρx∗1, suppose that truth-telling constraint (32) binds with
λ3 > 0. As discussed when (32) binds we have only one case of equilibrium with λ1 = 0,
λ2 > 0, λ3 > 0. The first-order conditions are reduced into
µ
β
= z
µ
β
=
ψi
β(ψi + yi)
= u
′
(x1)− λ3
ρ
= 1 + λ2 (2.50)
θu
′
(x2) +
λ3
1− ρ = 1 + λ2 (2.51)
from (2.34)-(2.37). Since the truth-telling constraint binds, we have x ≡ x1 = x2 in equilib-
rium. Thus (2.50) and (2.51) can be reduced into
u
′
(x)− λ3
ρ
= θu
′
(x) +
λ3
1− ρ (2.52)
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Figure 2.5: Liquidity Trap Equilibrium
Then binding constraints (2.31)-(2.32) with asset market clearing condition (2.38) and gov-
ernment budget constraint (2.41) can be reduced into
ρxu
′
(x) + (1− ρ)θxu′(x) = V + βy
i{ρu′(x) + (1− ρ)θu′(x)}
1− β{ρu′(x) + (1− ρ)θu′(x)} (2.53)
The allocation x is determined at x = x˘1 in which government budget constraint intersects
with 45 degree line as shown in Figure 2.5. Note that x˘1 is fixed and
1
µ
= r < 1
β
holds with
z = 1 in equilibrium. Thus in the Liquidity-trap equilibrium rates of return in money and
illiquid assets are same and open market operations are no longer effective. Note that the
feasibility condition (2.53) is similar to (2.49) with x1 = x2. However, the consumption level
x in (2.53) is greater than the consumption level x1 = x2 in (2.49) with z = θ because liquid
assets also have a liquidity premium in the liquidity trap equilibrium.
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2.4.1 Liquidity Trap and Excess Reserves
In this subsection let me elaborate the implementation of monetary policy in the Asset-
shortage Equilibrium and Liquidity-trap equilibrium. Given the scarcity of illiquid assets
with V +ψif < ρx
∗
1+(1−ρ)x∗2 and V ≥ ρx∗1, there exist two different regions in the equilibrium
under private information. In a region of x1 ∈ (xˆ1, x˜1] we have x1 < x∗1, x2 < x∗2and
1
µ
< r < 1
β
in the Asset-shortage Equilibrium. In equilibrium the monetary authority can
choose the equilibrium allocation along with the feasibility condition (2.49) by exchanging
outside currency and government bonds in the market. For example, injecting money and
absorbing government bonds decreases the nominal interest rate, 1
z
−1, and currency trade x1
increases whereas credit arrangement x2decreases. On the other hand, in a point of x1 = x˘1
we have x1 < x
∗
1, x2 < x
∗
2and
1
µ
= r < 1
β
in the Liquidity-trap Equilibrium as described.
Thus if the type information is public, then the equilibrium allocation x1 = x¯1 with z = 1
is feasible. Note that in this equilibrium we have x2 < x1 and
1
µ
= r < 1
β
. Let’s define this
equilibrium case as Zero-lower-bound(ZLB) Equilibrium. In the Zero-lower-bound equilib-
rium rates of return in money and illiquid assets are also same as shown in Liquidity-trap
equilibrium. Thus open market operations are also ineffective in real allocations. Injecting
money just increases the amount of excess reserves and the nominal interest rate is zero in
equilibrium. However, the equilibrium allocations are different between Zero-lower-bound
equilibrium and Liquidity-trap equilibrium. Moreover, the reasons for the ineffective mone-
tary policy are different. In the Zero-lower-bound equilibrium, monetary policy is ineffective
because the rates of return are set as same for both liquid and illiquid assets. But in the
Liquidity-trap equilibrium monetary policy is ineffective because the excess reserves are re-
quired to separate the types under private information. Thus the same rates of return on
liquid and illiquid assets with zero nominal interest rate is a consequence of equilibrium
allocation instead of choice of monetary authority.
Proposition 2.6 Given θ < 1, there exists a unique Liquidity-trap equilibrium away from
the Zero-lower-bound equilibrium under private information.
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Proof. In Liquidity-trap equilibrium the allocation x = x1 = x2 which satisfies (2.53). It
is unique since the left side of (2.53) is strictly increasing in x while the risght side
of (2.5) is strictly decreasing in x. The allocation x = x1 = x2 which satisfies (2.53)
is different from the allocation in the Zero-lower-bound equilibrium because x1 > x2
holds in the Zero-lower-bound equilibrium.
Note that if θ = 1 is assumed, Liquidity-trap equilibrium overlaps with Zero-lower-bound
equilibrium because the truth-telling constraint does not bind even at the zero nominal
interest rate.
It is hard to differentiate the existence of Liquidity-trap equilibrium from Zero-lower-
bound equilibrium in reality. However, if there exists a cost of operating credit arrangement
or inefficiency in credit arrangement such as haircut then there could exist a jump from
z = θ to z = 1 in equilibrium.9 Figure 6, which is replicated from Orphanides (2004),
describes a movement of nominal interest rates along with excess reserves in the period of
Great Depression. It is shown that there exists a volatile movement in nominal interest rates
with excess reserves in a period of Great Depression. This implies at least that the monetary
authority could lose its control on nominal interest rates in a neighborhood of zero lower
bound.
2.4.2 Private Assets
In this subsection I discuss whether the scarcity of private assets can influence in the equilib-
rium allocations when incentive constraint binds. If there is no private illiquid assets, yi = 0,
then the equilibrium conditions (2.49) and (2.53) are transformed into
ρx1u
′
(x1) + (1− ρ)θx2u′(x2) = V (2.54)
9However, if a floor system which directly sets interest rates for reserves is available, then nominal interest
rates are achieved exactly by setting the interest on reserves as same as the nominal interest rate target.
Thus there would exist no jump in nominal interest rates.
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Treasury Bill Rates
Excess Reserves
Figure 2.6: Treasury Bill Rates and Excess Reserves in Great Depression
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and
ρxu
′
(x) + (1− ρ)θxu′(x) = V, (2.55)
respectively. Then since (2.54) and (2.55) are same when the truth-telling constraint binds
with x1 = x2, the equilibrium allocation does not change as excess reserves increase. How-
ever, if there is private illiquid assets, yi > 0, then x = x˘1 in (2.53) is greater than
x1 = x2 = x˜1 in (2.49) as long as θ < 1. Thus there is a benefit of holding excess re-
serves. In the Liquidity-trap equilibrium the rate of return in liquid assets must be the
same as the rate of return in illiquid assets because excess reserves are required in equilib-
rium. Thus rates of return in liquid assets would increase while rates of return in illiquid
assets would decrease as equilibrium allocation moves from Asset-shortage Equilibrium to
Liquidity-trap equilibrium. Thus the price of private assets would also increase and it would
relax equilibrium condition (2.53).
2.4.3 Optimal Monetary Policy
When we add up expected utilities across agents in a stationary equilibrium, our welfare
measure is
W = ρ{u(x1)− x1}+ (1− ρ){θu(x2)− x2} (2.56)
that represents the sum of the trade surpluses in the DM. Note that the first-best is (x∗1, x
∗
2)
where x∗1 > x
∗
2 and marginal utility of each type buyer is same when the allocations are along
the curve with u
′
(x1) = θu
′
(x2).
In order to know whether the liquidity-trap equilibrium is optimal, I consider the opti-
mal monetary policy in a neighborhood of the equilibrium allocation with z = θ since the
consumption level of liquidity-trap equilibrium would be greater as long as θ < 1. Since the
welfare function and feasible allocations in the (2.49) can be described in a (x1, x2) plain, I
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Figure 2.7: Optimal Monetary Policy
compare their slopes at x1 = x˜1.
At x1 = x˜1the allocation satisfies with binding incentive constraint, x = x1 = x2. Thus
in the (x1, x2) plain the slope of welfare function at x = x1 = x2 is
∂x2
∂x1
= − ρ{u
′
(x)− 1}
(1− ρ){θu′(x)− 1} < −
ρ
(1− ρ)θ . (2.57)
The slope of the government budget constraint (2.49) at x = x1 = x2 is
∂x2
∂x1
= − ρ{u
′
(x) + xu
′′
(x)}
(1− ρ)θ{u′(x) + xu′′(x)} −K ′(x2) > −
ρ
(1− ρ)θ (2.58)
where K(x2) =
βyiθu
′
(x2)
1−βθu′ (x2) . Since u
′
(x) + xu
′′
(x) > 0 and K
′
(x2) < 0, the slope of welfare
function is steeper at liquidity trap equilibrium. It implies that the optimal equilibrium
allocation is achieved at the Liquidity-trap equilibrium.
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2.5 Discussion
It is certain that the liquidity trap - a situation in which the implementation of monetary
policy cannot influence in the market and real economy - is a serious concern for policy
makers. In the history of the Great Depression the short-term interest rates decreased to
zero in 1930-1932 and remained at zero for several years. Excess reserves in the banks
increased and bank credit failed to expand until 1936-1937. Brunner and Meltzer (1968)
suggest as an alternative that a trap could have been operated within the banking system
when banks desired to hold excess reserves and were unwilling to lend. It is also shown that
the Federal Reserve bank officers had this situation in mind: Chairman Eccles testified at
the U.S. Congress in 1935 that, even if currency was used to purchase government bonds
from the public, there would be no increase in the money supply or in bank credit.
Mr. Cross: “Why not pay off all government bonds and get rid of paying any
interest—because that would be inflation itself?”
Governor Eccles: “Here is what would happen... such-action would simply in-
crease the reserves of the banking system by the amount of government bonds
which were purchased with currency. The currency would go out, if it was $10
billion or $20 billion or $3 billion, whatever amount the government paid out
in currency to retire its bonds; but the currency would immediately go into the
banks and from the banks into the Federal Reserve banks... and you would have;
additional reserves, additional excess reserves...”
It is hard to confirm that there was a liquidity trap in the Great Depression and that this
liquidity trap occurred because banks desired to hold excess reserves. However, this paper
shows that there is a possibility of a liquidity trap when banks have an incentive to hold
liquid assets in their balance sheet.
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2.6 Conclusion
In the paper I construct a banking model to study how private information confines liquidity
insurance and the implementation of monetary policy. Given idiosyncratic liquidity shocks,
lack of memory generates private information on types. A truth-telling banking contract is
offered to provide liquidity efficiently under private information. When the supply of total
assets is not enough to support liquidity distribution, the truth-telling incentive constraint
binds and a liquidity premium arises in the price of illiquid assets. In the extended model with
monetary policy when the truth-telling constraint binds, there exists a liquidity trap in which
open market operations are ineffective in real allocations. This liquidity-trap equilibrium
is different from the previous ones with currency-shortage or zero-lower-bound because it
is generated by the incentive of banks to hold illiquid and even liquid assets for efficient
liquidity provision.
This paper takes a step forward to understand the liquidity trap. It provides a model
in which the liquidity trap can exist when banks have an incentive to hold liquid assets in
their balance sheets so that it opens a possibility of studying the liquidity trap further. But
it also leaves further questions unanswered. For example, liquid assets in a bank’s balance
sheet can play a role in preventing bank runs. In this respect we can ask how fragility of
banks is associated with the effectiveness of monetary policy. This question requires a deeper
consideration and explicit modeling on bank runs as a part of the model for the liquidity
trap.
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